

AD A119701

BU SURER SEASON

By.

A. Conglish S. Sandalish V. Sandalish

for

Federal Carlosics Charge and American

Approved for Public Schools Steady Steady Section (47 Miles

At some future that extenting buildings is this sential of the surveyed and thank find for expending surveyed and thank find for expending surveyed and plant protection for expending surveyed of a nuclear seapon attack. Expedient approach refers to expending the survey of a nuclear seapon attack. Expedient approach refers to expending the survey of the surve

The study described here was concerned with predicting the predicting the product of survival of people located in expediently appraisate, connections and the survival of people located in expediently appraisate, connections of people to the blast effects produced by the detention of a local measurement of the ground surface. Two categories of potential successions considered here, i.e., engineered buildings and tracked single where the dences. These are described.

The first category refers to low rise engineered belidings ACCA Common The besement walls, both exterior and interior are unexposed and the first floor slab, the slab over the besement, is at grade. The first floor also is thus the primary structural component for the besement as for at accommon tion from blast is concerned. Its collapse will result to committee the debris from the collapsed slab and due to blast processes and blast when entering shelter areas when the theirer envelope is broadent.

The stab over the assessment out of the second Stable Stab

The state of the s

The property recognizery reports the property of the property

Six shalters were grainated. First, each process: Not recipied to the granded with a graded using the stages!! concept, second, two of the process will repeated by evaluated using the post and been concept. The process will repeated by assuming that I ft of soil would be placed over the first floor by marketing protection. Placing 2 ft of soil sould adjust the marketing a few as sometimes the floor system of these basements. The base incolvening a few as soon the floor system of these basements. The base incolvening a few as soon the redistion protection was, therefore, not complicated.

A probability of survival function was developed for each share and each appreciate scheme. The procedure used to accomplish this consider at the party. The first is a probabilistic structural analysis which excepting supposed it to it fallure to the shalter shvelope. The second is a Cabbellian people survival analysis which considers the cases by accounts maderated accomplished analysis which considers the cases by accounts maderated accomplished and primary blast. The probability of accounts maderate accounts of a computing the account its of accounting the account its of account its of accounting the accounting the account its of accounting the accounting the accounting the account its of accounting the accounting the accounting the account its of accounting the accounting

The englysis orders and the second se

#### DAMAGE FUNCTIONS FOR UPGRADED SHELTERS

FEMA Contract EMW-C-0374

FINAL REPORT

Ву

A. Longinow M-Y. Wu J. Mohammadi

for

Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472

August 1982



Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited

#### FEMA REVIEW NOTICE

This report has been reviewed in the Federal Emergency Management Agency and approved for publication. Approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Date Entered)

REPORT DOC	READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING PORM				
T. REPORT NUMBER		2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER		
<u> </u>		AD-A119701			
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)	•	VIO STATE OF THE	S. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED		
			Final Report		
DAMAGE FUNCTIONS FOR U	PGRADED SHELT	TERS	Sept. 15, 1980 to Aug. 20, 1981		
		- <del>-</del> -	6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER		
			J6528		
7. AUTHOR(s)			S. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)		
A. Longinow					
M-Y. Wu			EMW-C-0374		
J. Mohammadi			10 000000000000000000000000000000000000		
	ME AND ADDRESS	•	10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS		
IIT Research Institute					
10 West 35th Street	16				
Chicago, Illinois 606		<del>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~</del>	12. REPORT DATE .		
Federal Emergency Manag			August 1982		
1725 I Street, N.W.	yement Agency	7	13. NUMBER OF PAGES		
Washington, D.C. 2047	•	ļ	236		
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME &	ADDRESS(if differen	for Controlling Office)	18. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)		
]					
		•1	Unclassified		
		:	154. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE		
			SCHEDULE		
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of	this Report)				
·					
Approved for public rel	lasca, diatri	lhuddan um3dmddad			
Approved for public re	lease; distri	ibution untimited	•		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of	the abstract entered	in Block 20, if different from	m Report)		
!					
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			į		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse	side if necessary an	d identify by block number)			
Civil defense	Casualties	• •			
Nuclear weapons	Survivors		ì		
Blast effects	Blast damage	<b>!</b>	j		
Personnel shelters	<b>Probabilisti</b>	c structural ana	itysts		
			·		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue en revorse i	ide if necessary and	I identify by block number)			
4-					
(Over)			·		
•			į		
			1		
			ł		
			j		
			:		

DD 1 JAN 73 1473

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Date Enter

## MISTRACT

The probability of survival is predicted of people located in conventional, expediently upgraded basements when subjected to the blast effects produced by the detonation of a 1-MT weapon near the ground surface. Two categories of potential shelters are considered here, i.e., engineered buildings and singlefamily residences.

The first category included 12 basements designed for live loads in the range from 50 psf to 250 psf and slab spans from 12 ft to 20 ft. Each of these was analyzed as expediently upgraded using four different upgrading schemes. An expedient upgrading scheme involves strengthening the slab over the basement by providing intermediate supports and blocking off all openings into the basement. This resulted in 60 shelters of different strengths which include the conventional, unupgraded slabs as base cases.

The second category included four conventional single-family dwellings with full basements. Each was evaluated when upgraded using a studwall upgrading concept. Two of the basements were reevaluated using the "post and beam" upgrading concept. These upgrading concepts are essentially similar and were used

as intermediate supports for strengthening the joist floor systems.

A probability of survival function was developed for each shelter and each upgrading scheme. The procedure used to accomplish this consists of two parts. The first is a probabilistic structural analysis which determines the probability of failure to the shelter envelope. The second is a probabilistic people survival analysis which considers two casualty producing mechanisms, i.e., debris effects from the collapse of the overhead slab and primary blast. The probability of structural failure is made use of in computing the probability of survival against debris effects.

The report includes a description of the shelters analyzed, a description of the method used in performing the analysis, detailed results, conclusions

and recommendations.

#### **FOREWORD**

This is the final report on IIT Research Institute (IITRI) project No. J06528 entitled, "Damage Functions for Upgraded Shelters." It was performed for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under Contract EMW-C-0374. The study was initiated September 15, 1980 and completed on August 20, 1981. The work was performed by Dr. A. Longinow (project engineer and principal investigator) and Mr. Ming-Yeh Wu of the Engineering Mechanics Section. Division M, IITRI, and by Dr. J. Mohammadi of the Department of Civil Engineering, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, Illinois. The study was monitored by Mr. D. A. Bettge of FEMA.

Respectfully submitted, IIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE

DNAINOL

Engineering Advisor

APPROVED:

Hu O. Brance

John A. Granath, Director Engineering Division

Accession For

BTIS CRASS
DTIC TAB
Unamounced
Justification

By
Distribution/
Availability Codes
Avail and/or
Dist Special

# METRIC CONVERSION FACTORS

	į		.5.5 c	<b>%</b> E	•	177		**		2 K 6	i: ì		•	• # <del>- 1</del>	8.
: Messeres	To Find	·	***			square inches square yards square miles		Dances pounds shart tone	•		Bellens cabic had cabic yands	a	Fabrankari temperatura	091 091	0.00
sions from Motric	Mattiety by	LENGTH	9.0	# C #	AREA	9.7 5.7 5.4	MASS (weight)	0.038 2.2 1.1	VOLUME	9.6 2.1 1.08	25 25 2.1	TEMPERATURE (oxect)	9. 5. (them add 32)	96 00 150	02 03 03
Appreximets Conversions from Metric Measures	When You Know	1	millianters continuelers	meters meters kildmeters	• 1	aquire continueters aquire motors aquire trimeters		graves hilograves seves (1000 kg)		milliters liters	filters cubic meters cubic meters	15M	Celsus	38	0 04- 00-
	Symbol		1 5	5		<b>ን</b> ጐን	2	.3.		1	- <u>-</u> ԴԴ	ı	٥		•
ez   	22	128	78   67 18   18   18   18   18   18   18   18	et Landananan	21							•   6			wa   
''	'l' ''		li li	ן ן	יייייי	1.  -	ין יין יין יין 	יןיין	` ' ' ''    •	[11][11]	3 			lalala.	inches
				85	5	37	ኔ ጀድ	-3	-	11	1	"E"	ı	٠	Pati. 2%.
Hessies		To Find		in the second se		and or an and an	agrees maters agrees hillometers hecters			ani Hillings	milliters liters liters	liters liters Cubic meters		Calsius	s sabites, was 1485 Miss., Publ. 256., 16.
Anne Comprises to Metric Messe		Madely to	LENGTH	4.8		AREA	223	MASS (weight)	3	: HOTEA	¥ • • •	8. s. c.	TEMPERATURE (exact)	S.9 later subtracting 32)	suggestion and made deliberies 50 Catalong hier C11,10 28
Accomplished Com-		When You Engage	1	13	11			1	3 080		Part Berra		TEM!	Fabrication Empirement	of as a 2,56 year Hot. For other exact convertions, but more detailed tables, that is the best of Classics for Classics for Classics for Cassics for C
		1,		1 4	34	ጉ ጉ′	<sub>ኑ</sub> ንን		4.	ŧ	<u>.</u>	. s 32	Ž.	<i>;</i>	The state of the s

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Cha	pter		Page		
1.	INTR	ODUCTION	1		
2.	STRU	6			
	2.1	Structure Idealization and Loading	6		
	2.2	Resistance Function	8		
	2.3	Dynamic Relations	11		
	2.4	Shear Resistance	12		
	2.5	Dynamic Response Analysis	14		
3.	PROB	ABILISTIC ANALYSIS	15		
	3.1	Probabilistic Analysis Approach	15		
	3.2	Estimating Means, Variances, and Covariances	20		
	3.3	Multiple Failure Modes	22		
	3.4	Analysis of System Survivability	22		
	3.5	Mean and Variance of the Peak Midpoint Deflection of the Slab	22		
	3.6	Mean and Variance of the Maximum Shear Stress	25		
	3.7	Probability of Shelter Failure	27		
		3.7.1 Probability of Slab Failure	27		
		3.7.2 Probabilities of Failure Due to Bending and Shear	28		
	3.8	Probability of People Survival	29		
4.	DESC	RIPTION OF SHELTERS	33		
	4.1	Basic Structure	33		
	4.2	Expedient Upgrading Schemes	33		
	4.3	Analysis Data	33		
5.	PEOPL	E SURVIVABILITY RESULTS	39		
6.	SUMM	MARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS	49		
	6.1	Summary	49		
	6.2	Conclusions	50		
	6.3	6.3 Recommendations			
		6.3.1 Experimental Task	51		
		6 2 2 Analysia Tack	52		

# TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.)

Chapter		Page				
APPENDIX	The tree and tree tree and tree tree tree	53				
	Basement of a Wood Frame Residence	53 53				
F.A						
	A.1.1 Material Properties	53				
	A.1.2 Applied Load	53				
	A.1.3 Member Sizes	57				
	A.1.4 Assumptions	57				
	A.1.5 Failure Probability of a Joist	57				
	A.1.5.1 Modes of Failure - Be' ng	57				
	A.1.5.2 Modes of Failure - Sh	62				
	A.1.5.3 Joist Failure Probabi v	63				
	A.1.5.4 Failure Probability c - Joist System	64				
	A.1.6 Failure Probability of the Gir	64				
	A.1.6.1 Analysis of Girder, Part 1	64				
	A.1.6.2 Analysis of Girder, Part 2	68				
	A.1.7 Failure Probability of Columns	69				
	A.1.7.1 Existing Columns	69				
	A.1.7.2 Studwall Columns	74				
	A.1.8 Failure Probability of the System	76				
A.2	Probability of People Survival	79				
APPENDIX	B: Probability of People Survival in Upgraded					
	Basements of Single-Family Residences	81				
B.1	Introduction	81				
B.2	General Assumptions	81				
B.3	Dunes House	83				
	B.3.1 Failure Probabilities	83				
	B.3.2 People Survival Probabilities	83				
B.4	West House	83				
	8.4.1 Failure Probabilities	90				
	B.4.2 People Survival Probabilities	90				
8.5	Park House	90				
	B.5.1 Failure Probabilities	96				
	B.5.2 People Survival Probabilities	96				

# TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.)

Page

37

40

47

56

Chapter

3.

4.

B.6	Tea Po	t House	102		
	B.6.1	Failure Probabilities, Scheme 1, Studwall Upgrading	104		
	B.6.2	People Survival Probabilities, Scheme 1, Studwall Upgrading	104		
	B.6.3	Failure Probabilities, Scheme 2, Girder and Column Upgrading	104		
	B.6.4	People Survival Probabilities, Scheme 2, Girder and Column Upgrading	104		
APPENDIX C: Structural Failure and People Survival Probability Data					
		LIST OF TABLES			
<u>Table</u>	•		Page		
1. Prob	ability	of Survival from Primary Blast, P(S <sub>pb</sub> )	29		
2. Stru	ctural	Parameters for One-Way Slab	34		

Reinforced Concrete Slab Analysis Data

A-1 Mechanical Properties of Joists

Summary of Results, Reinforced Concrete Basement Shelters

Overpressure Ranges at the 90 and 50 Percent Probability of Survival (Case 1)  $\,$ 

# LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figu	<u>re</u>	Page
1.	Basement shelter, plan and evaluation views -	7
2.	Resistance function for a two-way slab	9
3.	Distribution of ultimate moments	9
4.	Assumed distribution of dynamic reactions along edges "a" and "b"	13
5.	Critical shear stress, V	13
6.	Effect of relative positions of $f_c^{(r)}$ on $P(F)$	16
7.	Effect of dispersion of $f_S^{(s)}$ and $f_R^{(r)}$ on $P(F)$	16
8.	Expedient upgrading, type C	31
9.	Basic slab and expedient upgrading schemes	35
10.	Failure probabilities due to flexure and shear, Case 1A	44
11.	Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) Case 1A	45
12.	Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds)	46
A-1	Basement plan	54
A-2	Joist, girder, and upper story partition layout	55
A-3	Expedient upgrading	58
A-4	Joist loading, shear and bending moment diagrams	59
A-5	Uniform distribution	60
A-6	Probability of joist failure	65
A-7	Girder loading, Part 1	66
8-A	Girder loading, Part 2	68
A-9	Probability of girder failure, Part 1	70
A-10	Probability of girder failure, Part 2	71
A-11	Probability of column failure	75
A-12	Failure probability of studwall column system	77
A-13	Probability of floor system failure, upper and lower bound	78
A-14	Probability of people survival, upper and lower bound	80
B-1	Post and beam expedient upgrading concept	82
B-2	Joists and existing girder failure probabilities, Dunes House	84
B-3	Column failure probabilities, Dunes House	85
B-4	Upgrading girders failure probabilities, Dunes House	86
B-5	Probability of floor system failure, upper and lower bound, Dunes House	87
B-6	Probability of people survival, upper and lower bound, Dunes House	88
B-7	West House, plan	89

# LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (Cont.)

Figur	<u>e</u>	<u>Page</u>
B-8	Failure probabilities for the joists, Girder 1 and Girder 2, West House	91
B-9	Failure probabilities for columns and studwalls, West House	92
B-10	Probability of floor system failure, upper and lower bound, West House	93
B-11	Probability of people survival, upper and lower bound, West House	94
B-12	Park House, plan	95
B-13	Elevation (Section A-A)	97
B-14	Studwall expedient upgrading	97
B-15	Failure probabilities of joists and existing girders, Park House	98
B-16	Failure probabilities of columns and studwalls, Park House	99
B-17	Probability of floor system failure, upper and lower bound, Park House	100
B-18	Probability of people survival, upper and lower bound, Park House	101
B-19	Tea Pot House basement plan	103
B-20	Joists and existing girders failure probabilties, Scheme 1, Tea Pot House	105
B-21	Studwalls and existing columns failure probabilities, Scheme 1, Tea Pot House	106
B-22	Probability of floor system failure, upper and lower bound, Scheme 1, Tea Pot House	107
B-23	Probability of people survival, upper and lower bound, Scheme 1, Tea Pot House	108
B-24	Joist and girder failure probabilities, Scheme 2, Tea Pot House	109
B-25	Failure probabilities of columns, Scheme 2, Tea Pot House	110
B-26	Probability of floor system failure, upper and lower bound, Scheme 2, Tea Pot House	111
B-27	Probability of people survival, upper and lower bound, Scheme 2, Tea Pot House	112
C-1 t	·	113-233

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

Eventually, existing buildings may need to be surveyed and designated for upgrading to provide fallout and blast protection for evacuees and workers of critical industries in the event of a nuclear weapon attack.

This study was concerned with predicting the probability of survival of people located in expediently upgraded conventional basements when subjected to the blast effects of a 1-MT weapon detonated near the ground surface. Two categories of basements are considered, i.e., basements of engineered buildings and basements of single family residences.

The first category refers to low-rise engineered buildings with basements. The first floor is at grade and, therefore, the slab over the basement is directly exposed to the blast load. The basement walls, by virtue of their location, are not directly exposed to the blast. In the analysis performed, the first floor slab is treated as the primary structural component. Its collapse will result in casualties due to debris impact and due to blast loads entering shelter areas when the shelter envelope is breached. Interior and exterior basement walls are assumed to be stronger than the overhead slab and are not explicitly considered in the analysis.

1

The first floor slab can be most expediently strengthened by reducing its effective span. This can be done by introducing intermediate supports. In this study such supports are applied to the slab but not to the walls. Such supports are referred to as "expedient upgrading" and may consist of timber, steel, and masonry.

The objective here is not to evaluate the particular supports used, but rather to determine the reliability of the shelter when an intermediate support is provided. Other studies have been devoted to the design and experimental evaluation of expedient upgrading schemes (Ref 1,2).

The first floor slab was designed (Ref 3) as a one-way system for live loads in the range from 50 psf to 250 psf. This represents a fairly wide range of use classes. The lower bound applies to classrooms and public rooms,

while the upper bound applies to industrial buildings, e.g., light manufacturing and some small warehouses. A total of twelve separate cases representing three different span lengths (12, 16, and 20 ft) and four different design live loads (50, 80, 125, and 250 psf) were considered. Each of the twelve basements was analyzed as expediently upgraded using four different upgrading schemes. This resulted in sixty shelters which include the conventional (unupgraded) design as the base case. As used in this study, an expedient upgrading scheme involves supporting the first floor slab and blocking off all openings into the basement.

The second category of shelter considered includes four conventional wood frame residences with basements. These are real buildings whose plans were obtained from local engineer/architect offices. Expedient upgrading schemes considered in this portion of the study include the "studwall" and "post and beam." The objective is to reduce the effective span length of the joist floor over the basement. Six shelters were evaluated. First, each basement was evaluated as upgraded using the studwall scheme. Second, two of the basements were reevaluated using the post and beam concept. The process was repeated by assuming that 1 ft of soil would be placed over the first floor for radiation protection. Placing 2 ft of soil would significantly affect the strength of the floor system. The case involving 2 ft of soil was, therefore, not considered.

A probability of survival function was developed for each shelter and each particular upgrading scheme. The method used in determining the probability of people survival is described.

The analysis procedure formulated and used in this study consists of two parts. The first part is a probabilistic structural analysis which determines the probability of shelter failure (collapse). This analysis is capable of considering all structural components and the respective failure modes of each component. For example, in the case of the reinforced concrete slab, both flexure and shear are considered as contributing to collapse. The probability of failure for each mode acting independent of the others is determined first. Correlation between them is not evaluated. The results are then used to determine the upper and lower bounds on the probability of failure for each component and then for the structure as a whole. As an example, see the analysis presented in Appendix A.

The second part is a probabilistic people survival analysis which makes use of the probability of structural failure results. Casualty mechanisms considered include debris from the collapse of the shelter and primary blast. Probability of survival against primary blast is determined on the basis of available casualty data (Ref 4). This report is arranged as follows.

Chapter 2 includes a detailed description of the structural analysis used in predicting the respose of reinforced concrete slabs when subjected to blast loading. The corresponding probabilistic analysis is presented in Chapter 3. These two chapters form the basis of a computer program which was started in the previous effort (Ref 5) and then modified and extended in the course of the study reported. This computer program is capable of computing the probability of survival of people located in basement shelters when subjected to blast produced by the detonation of a nuclear weapon. The procedure used is as described in the previous paragraphs of this chapter.

In its present form this computer program can analyze basement shelters in which the roof slab is the primary structural component and the walls are not considered in the analysis. It, therefore, applies to cases in which the walls are not exposed to the blast, or by virtue of their design and location are substantially stronger than the slab. The program consists of two separate parts, which treat the following problems:

- (1) Basements with two-way roof slabs and with membrane resistance along two or four opposite edges. In addition to membrane resistance, four support conditions may be considered.
  - (a) All edges simply supported
  - (b) All edges fixed (clamped)
  - (c) Long edges simply supported, short edges fixed
  - (d) Short edges simply supported, long edges fixed.
- (2) Basements with two-way roof slabs, without membrane resistance. These four support conditions may be considered.
  - (a) All edges simply supported
  - (b) All edges fixed

C

- (c) Long edges simply supported, short edges fixed
- (d) Short edges simply supported, long edges fixed.

The computer program computes the probability of survival for people located in basements when subjected to blast effects produced by the detonation of a nuclear weapon in its Mach region. Megaton or kiloton weapons may be specified. The computer program has some of the following features.

- (1) It predicts the upper and lower bounds on the probability of component collapse. In doing this both the flexural and shear modes of failure are considered.
- (2) Predicts the probability of people survival based on:
  - (a) Debris effects from the collapse of the overhead slab(b) Blast pressures due to primary blast.

Slab collapse modes on which the debris effects are based were estimated based on review of experimental data.

(3) Considers statistical variability in the following parameters: Blast load parameters - F1, t4

Structure parameters -  $A_s$ ,  $A_s^i$ ,  $f_c^i$ ,  $f_v$ , d,  $d^i$ ,  $\phi$ 

where F<sub>1</sub> = peak overpressure

t, = positive phase duration

A = tension steel

A: = compression steel

f' = compressive concrete strength

f, = reinforcement yield strength

It is our considered opinion that this computer program is superior to any that exist in related areas. The reasons are:

- (1) The program analyzes actual structures and makes predictions on the basis of analytic results. No scaling is involved.
- Parameter variability is considered in more detail and on a larger scale then other methods (such as the FAST code. Reference 19, for example). The results, therefore, are more reliable.
- (3) The program is capable of evaluating the effectiveness of different expedient upgrading schemes on people survivability.

- (4) The program does not use a simulation approach, such as Monte Carlo, for example, and is, therefore, quick and economical in computer usage.
- (5) The program is oriented specifically to the civil defense (national security) problem.

This computer program can and should be extended to include a more complete set of structural components, i.e., walls, columns, and girders. This would extend its applicability to a wider class of structures and would thus increase its utility.

For the sake of clarity and generality in presentation, the structural analysis procedure given in Chapter 2 and the probabilistic analysis procedure given in Chapter 3 are explained with reference to a square, two-way slab fixed along the edges.

Reinforced concrete shelters considered here are described in Chapter 4 which also includes a description of the expedient upgrading options considered. People survivability results are summarized in Chapter 5. Conclusions and recommendations are presented in Chapter 5 together with a short summary of this study.

Analysis of residential basements is presented in Appendices A and B. Appendix C contains detailed probability of failure and probability of survival results for the reinforced concrete basement shelters.

#### 2. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

#### 2.1 STRUCTURE IDEALIZATION AND LOADING

The general form of the structural analysis performed in this study is described in Reference 6 and discussed in relation to the structure shown in Figure 1. This is a portion of a conventional basement which serves as a personnel shelter against the effects of blast produced by a nuclear weapon detonated near the ground surface. With the entranceways and other openings into the basement blocked off, the structural component of primary interest is the first floor slab. Its collapse will result in casualties due to slab debris impact and due to blast pressures and velocities penetrating basement areas where people would be located. Basement walls, both interior and exterior (peripheral), are not expected to fail prior to the failure of the first floor slab and are, therefore, not considered in the analysis.

The roof (first floor) slab is modeled as a single degree of freedom system whose resistance is a piecewise linear function. The point at which response is sought is at the center of the slab. We are interested in its peak deflection when the slab is subjected to a time dependent load over its surface. We are also interested in the peak dynamic reactions distributed along the edges of the slab. The blast load is approximated using the following expression (Ref 7):

$$F(f) = F_1 (1 - \frac{t}{t_d}) e^{-t/t_d}$$
 (1)

where  $F_1$  = peak load magnitude

 $t_A$  = positive phase duration of the blast load.

The spatial distribution of the blast load is assumed to be uniform over the surface of the slab. The interaction of the blast wave with the building

£.

C




Figure 1. Basement shelter, plan and elevation views.

(b) Elevation, span "b"

above the basement is assumed not to modify the free-field character of the blast wave to any significant extent. Therefore, equation (1) need not be modified for this effect.

#### 2.2 RESISTANCE FUNCTION

A resistance function for uniformly loaded, two-way reinforced concrete slabs fixed along the edges is shown in Figure 2. The maximum resistance in the elastic range,  $R_1$  is assumed to be developed when the most highly stressed section reaches its plastic resistance. For slabs fixed along the edges this section is along the long edges. For a square, clamped slab for example,  $R_1$  is (Ref 6)

$$R_1 = 29.2 \, M_{ub}^{\circ}$$
 (2)

where M° = negative ultimate moment capacity per unit width at the center of the long edge.

The maximum resistance in the elasto-plastic range,  $R_2$ , is determined on the assumption that the ultimate bending moment is developed along all yield lines representing a minimum load yield pattern. Thus for a square clamped slab (Ref 6)

$$R_2 = \frac{12}{a} \left( M_{u1} + M_{u2} + M_{u3} + M_{u4} \right) \tag{3}$$

where Mul = total ultimate moment capacity along mispan section parallel to edge "a"

Mu2 = total negative ultimate moment capacity along edge "a"

Mu3 = total ultimate moment capacity along midspan section parallel to edge "b"

Mu4 = total negative ultimate moment capacity along edge "b" (see Figure 3 for distribution of ultimate moments)

a = span length in the short direction.




Figure 2. Resistance function for a two-way slab.




Figure 3. Distribution of ultimate moments.

The midpoint deflection  $y_1$  is

$$y_{\eta} = \frac{R_{\eta}}{k_{\eta}} \tag{4}$$

where  $k_1$ , the slab stiffness in the elastic range for a square, clamped slab for example, is (Ref 6)

$$k_{1} = \frac{810 \text{ E I}_{a}}{a^{2}} \tag{5}$$

where E = modulus of elasticity of concrete

I, = moment of inertia of a unit width of slab.

$$E = 33w^{3/2} \sqrt{f_c}$$
 (6)

where w = unit weight of concrete, lb/cu ft

 $f_{C}^{\prime}$  = ultimate compressive strength of concrete, psi.

$$I_a = \frac{bd^3}{2} (5.5 \rho_a + 0.083)$$
 (7)

where  $\rho_a$  = average reinforcement ratio, for a slab with uniform reinforcement,  $\rho_a$  =  $A_s/bd$ , where  $A_s$  is the steel area per unit width, b, and d is the effective depth of the section.

$$y_2 = y_1 + \frac{R_2 - R_1}{k_2} \tag{8}$$

where  $k_2$ , the slab stiffness in the elasto-plastic range also for a square, clamped slab, is (Ref 6)

$$k_2 = \frac{252 \text{ E I}_a}{a^2}$$
 (9)

Based on an examination of experimental results, Reference 8 recommends that the failure (incipient collapse) deflection,  $\mathbf{y}_{\mathbf{m}}$ , be computed as

$$y_{\rm m} = 0.15a$$
 (10)

### 2.3 DYNAMIC REACTIONS

The dynamic reactions along the edges of two-way slabs are determined on the basis of the assumption that the distribution of the inertial forces is the same as the assumed deflected shape of the slab and the resistance is uniformly distributed.

For a fixed, uniformly loaded two-way slab with a/b = 0.5 for example, the total dynamic reaction,  $V_a$ , at edge "a" in the elastic range is (Ref 6)

$$V_a = 0.05P + 0.08R$$
 (11)

The corresponding dynamic reaction at edge "b" is

$$V_b = 0.12P + 0.25R$$
 (12)

In the elasto-plastic range

$$V_a = 0.04P + 0.09R$$
 (13)

$$V_{h} = 0.09P + 0.28R$$
 (14)

In the plastic range

$$V_a = 0.04P + 0.08R_2$$
 (15)

$$V_b = 0.11P + 0.27R_2$$
 (16)

where 
$$P = abF_1(t)$$
 (17)

$$R = R(y) \tag{18}$$

It was assumed in this study that the dynamic reactions are uniformly distributed along the respective edges (Figure 4). The critical shear stress,  $\overline{\mathbf{v}}_{\mathbf{u}}$ , was computed at a section, d/2, from the face of support using the approximation shown in Figure 5. Thus, the critical shear stress along edge "b" is

$$\overline{v}_{ub} = \frac{v_{ub}}{a} (a - t_w - d)$$
 (19)

$$\overline{v}_{ua} = \frac{v_{ua}}{b} (b - t_w - d)$$
 (20)

where

$$v_{ub} = \frac{V_b}{bd} \tag{21}$$

$$v_{ua} = \frac{V_a}{ad} \tag{22}$$

tw = support (wall) thickness

d = effective depth of slab.

#### 2.4 SHEAR RESISTANCE

The shear resistance provided by the concrete can be computed using the following expression (Refs 9,10)

$$V_{c} = \left(1.9 \sqrt{f_{c}^{T}} + 2500 \rho_{W} \frac{V_{ud}}{M_{u}}\right) bd$$
 (23)

but not greater than 3.5 bd  $\sqrt{f_C^T}$ , where  $\rho_w = A_S/bd$ 

b = width of section

 $V_{ii}$  = the shear at the section

 $\mathbf{M_u} = \mathbf{the} \ \mathbf{bending} \ \mathbf{moment} \ \mathbf{at} \ \mathbf{the} \ \mathbf{section} \ \mathbf{occurring} \ \mathbf{simulataneously} \ \mathbf{with} \ \mathbf{V_u}.$ 

The quantity  $V_{ud}/M_u$  is not to be taken greater than 1.0 in computing  $V_c$ .




Figure 4. Assumed distribution of dynamic reactions along edges "a" and "b".




Figure 5. Critical shear stress,  $\boldsymbol{\tilde{V}}_{\!a}$  .

The shear resistance can also be approximated (Ref 10) by

$$V_{c} = 2 \sqrt{f_{c}^{T}} \text{ bd}$$
 (24)

According to Reference 9, equation (23) is too conservative for predicting structural failure due to shear and recommends that values obtained from equation (23) be increased by 50% when used for this purpose. Consequently, the following expression was used in investigating shear failure of slabs:

$$v_m = 1.5 \frac{V_C}{bd} \tag{25}$$

where  $v_m$  = the unit capacity of the slab.

In computing  $\mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{m}}$ , the ultimate dynamic strength of concrete,  $\mathbf{f}_{\mathbf{dc}}^{\iota}$ , was used.

$$f_{dc}^{i} = 1.25 f_{c}^{i}$$
 (26)

#### 2.5 DYNAMIC RESPONSE ANALYSIS

Since both the loading and resistance are complex functions, it was necessary to use a numerical procedure to obtain the peak midpoint deflection of the slab and the peak dynamic reactions. The equation solved is

$$K_{LM} M_t \ddot{y} + R(y) = F(t)$$
 (27)

where K<sub>LM</sub> \*\* the load-mass factor which is used to transform the real system to an equivalent single degree of freedom system. For a square, clamped reinforced concrete slab, K<sub>LM</sub> has the following values (Ref 6):
Elastic range, K<sub>LM</sub> = 0.63
Elasto-plastic range, K<sub>LM</sub> = 0.67
Plastic range, K<sub>LM</sub> = 0.51
In the membrane range, K<sub>LM</sub> was taken as 1.0

 $M_+$  = the total mass of the slab

R(y) = resistance

F(t) = load-time history, see equation (1).

#### 3. PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS

The survivability or vulnerability of a structure to a given load is a matter of available resistance relative to the imposed load. If the load and resistance could be specified exactly, there would be no question about predicting survivability. However, due to uncertainties, neither the load nor the resistance can be specified precisely and for this reason survivability needs to be expressed in terms of a probability.

For a structure with resistance R and load S, where R and S are random variables, survival is the event R>S and conversely, failure is the event R<S. If  $f_S$  and  $f_R$  are respectively the probability density functions of applied load and resistance, then the probability of failure, P(F), may be related to the overlapping region between  $f_S$  and  $f_R$  (see Figure 6). Accordingly, the probability of failure is a function of the relative position between  $\mu_S$  and  $\mu_\Gamma$  (see Figure 6) where  $\mu_S$  and  $\mu_\Gamma$  are the expected values of S and R, respectively. The probability of failure also depends on the degree of uncertainty (dispersion) in R and S as shown in Figure 7.

Uncertainties arise due to variability in each of the load and resistance parameters, and due to imperfections in the analytic models used in calculating load and resistance.

#### 3.1 PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS APPROACH

4.

The previous discussion points out the importance of treating the problem of survivability evaluation in probabilistic terms. The corresponding general framework for doing this is described.

For a given structure, its performance function Z can be defined as

 $Z = R - S \tag{28}$ 




Figure 6. Effect of relative positions of  $f_S^{(s)}$  and  $f_R^{(r)}$  on P(F).




Figure 7. Effect of dispersion of  $f_S^{(s)}$  and  $f_R^{(r)}$  on P(F).

R and S are respectively functions of several variables and, therefore, also Z, thus

$$Z = g(X_1, X_2, ..., X_N)$$
 (29)

The performance limit, i.e., the minimum level of performance that is required for survival, can be set at  $Z = z_0$ . If  $z_0 = 0$ , then  $Z \le z_0$  defines a failure state and  $Z > z_0$  defines a survival state. Accordingly, the probability of survival,  $P(\overline{F})$  is

$$P(\overline{F}) = P(Z > z_0) \tag{30}$$

and the probability of failure, P(F), is

$$P(F) = 1 - P(\overline{F}) = P(Z \le z_0)$$
 (31)

If the probability distribution (probability density function) of Z is known, then the probability of failure would be

$$P(F) = \int_{z_0}^{z_0} f_{Z}(z)dz = F_{Z}(z_0)$$
 (32)

Consider the case in which R and S are known to be lognormal with mean (expected) values  $\mu_R$  and  $\mu_S$  and coefficients of variation  $\Omega_R$  and  $\Omega_S$ . Assume also that

- (1) R and S are statistically independent
- (2) The probability distributions on R and S are known
- (3) The uncertainty is due only to randomness as described in the distribution  $f_7(z)$
- (4) The performance limit  $z_0 = 0$ .

For this case, the performance function is

$$Z = \ln(R/S) \tag{33}$$

Since R and S are lognormal variates, their logarithms are normal variates and thus Z = ln(R/S) = lnR - lnS is also a normal variate. Therefore, the probability of failure is

$$P(F) = F_{Z}(z_{0}) = \Phi\left(\frac{z_{0} - \mu_{Z}}{\sigma_{Z}}\right)$$
 (34)

where  $\Phi$  ( ) = cumulative density function of the normal distribution

 $\mu_{z}$  = mean (expected) value of Z

 $\sigma_7$  = standard deviation of Z.

The expected value and standard deviation of Z are obtained as (Ref 11)

$$\mu_{Z} = \left[ \ln \mu_{R} - \frac{1}{2} \ln \left( 1 + \Omega_{R}^{2} \right) \right] - \left[ \ln \mu_{S} - \frac{1}{2} \ln \left( 1 + \Omega_{S}^{2} \right) \right]$$
 (35)

where  $\mu_R$ ,  $\mu_S$  = mean values of R and S, respectively

 $\Omega_{\rm R}$ ,  $\Omega_{\rm S}$  = coefficients of variation of R and S, respectively.

Rearranging R and S,  $\mu_{\boldsymbol{7}}$  becomes

$$\mu_{Z} = \ln \left[ \frac{\mu_{R} \sqrt{1 + \Omega_{S}^{2}}}{\mu_{S} \sqrt{1 + \Omega_{R}^{2}}} \right]$$
 (36)

$$\sigma_{Z}^{2} = V(Z) = V(\ln R) + V(\ln S) = \ln(1 + \Omega_{R}^{2}) + \ln(1 + \Omega_{S}^{2})$$
 (37)

where V( ) = variance of respective parameter

$$\sigma_{Z} = \sqrt{\ln \left[ (1 + \Omega_{R}^{2})(1 + \Omega_{S}^{2}) \right]}$$
 (38)

Substituting  $\boldsymbol{\mu}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}$  and  $\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{\boldsymbol{Z}}$  into equation (34), P(F) becomes

$$P(F) = \Phi \left[ \frac{-\ln \left[ \frac{\mu_R}{\mu_S} \sqrt{1 + \Omega_S^2} \right]}{\sqrt{\ln \left[ (1 + \Omega_R^2)(1 + \Omega_S^2) \right]}} \right]$$
(39)

If  $\Omega_{R}$  and  $\Omega_{S}$  are not too large, less than about 0.30, then

$$P(F) \simeq \Phi \left[ \frac{-\ln \left( \mu_R / \mu_S \right)}{\sqrt{\Omega_R^2 + \Omega_S^2}} \right]$$
 (40)

The task of determining  $f_Z(z)$  and thus  $F_Z(z)$  is generally very involved. The required distribution,  $f_Z(z)$ , including its parameters, needs to be derived from  $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n$  consistent with equation (29). Given the density functions  $f_{X_1}(x_1), f_{X_2}(x_2), \ldots, f_{X_n}(x_n)$ , the cumulative density function (CDF) of Z for independent  $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n$  would be -

$$F_{Z}(z) = \int \int \int f_{x_1} f_{x_2} \dots f_{x_n} dx_1 dx_2 \dots dx_n$$

$$\{g(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n \le z)\}$$
(41)

from which the probability of failure would be obtained.

The effort to derive the exact distribution of Z through equation (41) is clearly laborious and in most cases impractical, because the density functions  $f_{x_1}$ ,  $f_{x_2}$ , ...,  $f_{x_n}$  are usually not known. The information on these variables is generally limited to the mean values and coefficients of variation. However, the necessary type of distribution for  $F_Z(z)$  may be prescribed, taking into account relevant physical factors that could contribute to the distribution form with consideration for mathematical tractability.

With regard to the required distribution for Z, we observe the following (Ref 12):

- (1) When  $P(F) > 10^{-3}$ , the calculated P(F) is approximately the same irrespective of the assumed distribution for Z.
- (2) When  $P(F) < 10^{-5}$ , the calculated P(F) could be very sensitive to the assumed distribution form.

In the light of these observations, the correct probability of failure may be estimated using any reasonable distribution for Z when  $P(F) > 10^{-3}$ ; whereas for cases where  $P(F) < 10^{-5}$ , a correct distribution for Z would be necessary to estimate the true risk.

In the case where R and S are not independent, equation (30) would involve the covariance between R and S and the method given in Reference 13 would need to be used.

### 3.2 ESTIMATING MEANS, VARIANCES, AND COVARIANCES

For the general function of a random variable x, i.e., y = f(x), the mean and variance are

$$E[f(x)] = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(x)g(x)dx$$
 (42)

$$V[f(x)] = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} [f(x) - \mu]^2 g(x) dx$$
 (43)

where  $\mu = E[f(x)]$ 

g(x) = the probability density function.

As discussed earlier in this narrative, in many practical applications g(x) may not be known and information may be limited to the mean and variance of the original variate x. Even if g(x) is known, the integrations indicated by equations (42) and (43) may be difficult to perform. For these reasons, approximate expressions for the mean, variance, and covariance may be obtained

by expanding known functions in Taylor series and neglecting all terms except the linear terms. If R is a function of n variables, i.e.,

$$R = f(x_1, x_2, ..., x_n)$$
 (44)

then it can be shown (Ref 14) that the expected value of R is -

$$E(R) = f(\overline{x}_1, \overline{x}_2, ..., \overline{x}_n)$$
 (45)

where  $\overline{x}_i$  = the mean value.

Also, the variance of R, V(R) is

$$V(R) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(\frac{\partial R}{\partial x_i}\right)^2 V(x_i) + 2 \sum_{\substack{j=1 \ i < j}}^{n-1} \sum_{\substack{j=2 \ j < j}}^{n} \frac{\partial R}{\partial x_j} \frac{\partial R}{\partial x_j} C(x_i, x_j)$$
(46)

where  $C(x_i, x_j) = covariance$  between  $x_i$  and  $x_j$ .

If two functions,  $R_1$  and  $R_2$ , are functions of the same n variables, i.e.,

$$R_1 = f_1(x_1, x_2, ..., x_n)$$

$$R_2 = f_2(x_1, x_2, ..., x_n)$$
(47)

then the covariance between  $\rm R_1$  and  $\rm R_2$  has the following form (Ref 14):

$$C(R_1, R_2) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\partial R_1}{\partial x_i} \frac{\partial R_2}{\partial x_i} V(x_i)$$
 (48)

#### 3.3 MULTIPLE FAILURE MODES

If there is more than one mode of failure for a given structural component, the probability of survival will be a function of the respective failure modes. Denoting by  $R_i$  the resistance in mode i and by  $S_i$  the corresponding load effect, the survival probability is theoretically (Ref 15)

$$P(\overline{F}) = P(R_1 > S_1 \cap R_2 > S_2 \cap \dots \cap R_n > S_n)$$
 (49)

Equation (49) applies to cases where the failure modes are independent. When the failure modes are highly correlated, the probability of survival becomes

$$P(\overline{F}) = \min P(R_{\uparrow} > S_{\uparrow})$$
 (50)

which means that the survival of the component is determined by the weakest mode.

## 3.4 ANALYSIS OF SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY

The probability of survival described thus far refers to that of a single structural component. The survivability of a complete structure consisting of combinations of such components will depend on the survivabilities of these components and the manner in which they are arranged and connected. The analysis will need to consider the correlation between the components and the degree of redundancy of the system. A procedure for accomplishing this is described in Reference 16.

#### 3.5 MEAN AND VARIANCE OF THE PEAK MIDPOINT DEFLECTION OF THE SLAB

This section contains expressions of the expected value,  $\bar{y}_p$ , and the variance,  $V(y_p)$  of the peak midpoint deflection,  $y_p$ , in the respective ranges of response, i.e., elastic, elasto-plastic, and plastic.

When the magnitude of the blast load is such that the response of the slab is in the elastic range, then (See Fig. 2)

$$R(y) = yR_1/y_1 \tag{51}$$

in accordance with equations (27) and (45) the expected value of the peak midpoint deflection can be expressed as a function of the following parameters, i.e.,

$$\overline{y}_{p} = f(\overline{F}_{1}, \overline{t}_{d}, \overline{R}_{1}, \overline{y}_{1}, \overline{M}_{t})$$
 (52)

As indicated previously,  $\overline{y}_p$  was determined numerically. The variance of  $y_p$  was also determined numerically using the following expression:

$$V(y_{p}) = \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial F_{1}}\right)^{2} V(F_{1}) + \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial t_{d}}\right)^{2} V(t_{d}) + \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{1}}\right)^{2} V(R_{1}) + \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{1}}\right)^{2} V(y_{1})$$

$$+ \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial M_{t}}\right)^{2} V(M_{t}) + 2 \left\{\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{1}} \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{1}} C(R_{1}, y_{1}) + \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{1}} \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial M_{t}} C(y_{1}, M_{t})\right\}$$

$$C(R_{1}, M_{t}) + \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{1}} \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial M_{t}} C(y_{1}, M_{t})$$
(53)

Similarly, when the response is in the elasto-plastic range,

$$R(y) = R_1 + \frac{R_2 - R_1}{y_2 - y_1} (y - y_1)$$
 (54)

$$\overline{y}_p = f(\overline{F}_1, \overline{t}_d, \overline{R}_1, \overline{R}_2, \overline{y}_1, \overline{y}_2, \overline{M}_t)$$
 (55)

$$\begin{split} v(y_{p}) &= \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial F_{1}}\right)^{2} V(F_{1}) + \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial t_{d}}\right)^{2} V(t_{d}) + \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{1}}\right)^{2} V(R_{1}) + \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{2}}\right)^{2} V(R_{2}) \\ &+ \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{1}}\right)^{2} V(y_{1}) + \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{2}}\right)^{2} V(y_{2}) + \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial M_{t}}\right)^{2} V(M_{t}) \\ &+ 2 \left\{\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{1}} \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{2}} C(R_{1}, R_{2}) + \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{1}} \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{1}} C(R_{1}, y_{1}) + \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{1}} \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{2}} C(R_{1}, y_{2}) \right. \\ &+ \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{1}} \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial M_{t}} C(R_{1}, M_{t}) + \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{2}} \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{1}} C(R_{2}, y_{1}) + \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{2}} \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{2}} C(R_{2}, y_{2}) \\ &+ \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{2}} \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial M_{t}} C(R_{2}, M_{t}) + \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{1}} \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{2}} C(y_{1}, y_{2}) + \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{1}} \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial M_{t}} C(y_{1}, M_{t}) \\ &+ \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{2}} \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial M_{t}} C(y_{2}, M_{t}) \right\} \end{split}$$
(56)

When the response is in the plastic range,  $R(y) = R_2$  and

 $+\frac{\partial y_0}{\partial y_0}\frac{\partial y_0}{\partial M_0}C(y_2,M_0)$ 

$$\begin{aligned} \widetilde{y}_{p} &= f(\widetilde{F}_{1}, \widetilde{E}_{d}, \widetilde{R}_{1}, \widetilde{R}_{2}, \widetilde{y}_{1}, \widetilde{y}_{2}, \widetilde{y}_{m}, \widetilde{M}_{t}) \end{aligned}$$

$$V(y_{p}) &= \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial F_{1}}\right)^{2} V(F_{1}) + \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial t_{d}}\right)^{2} V(t_{d}) + \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{1}}\right)^{2} V(R_{1}) + \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{2}}\right)^{2} V(R_{2}) \\ &+ \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{1}}\right)^{2} V(y_{1}) + \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{2}}\right)^{2} V(y_{2}) + \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{m}}\right)^{2} V(y_{m}) + \left(\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial H_{t}}\right)^{2} V(M_{t}) \\ &+ 2 \left\{\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{1}} \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{2}} C(R_{1}, R_{2}) + \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{1}} \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{1}} C(R_{1}, y_{1}) + \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{1}} \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{2}} C(R_{1}, y_{2}) \right. \\ &+ \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{1}} \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial M_{t}} C(R_{1}, M_{t}) + \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{2}} \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{1}} C(R_{2}, y_{1}) + \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{2}} \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{2}} C(R_{2}, y_{2}) \end{aligned}$$

(58)

 $+\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial R_{n}}\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial M_{n}}C(R_{2},M_{t}) + \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial v_{n}}\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{n}}C(y_{1},y_{2}) + \frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial y_{1}}\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial M_{n}}C(y_{1},M_{t})$ 

#### 3.6 MEAN AND VARIANCE OF THE MAXIMUM SHEAR STRESS

This section contains expressions of the expected value,  $\overline{v}_{up}$ , and the variance,  $V(v_{up})$  of the maximum shear stress in the respective ranges of slab response, i.e., elastic, elasto-plastic, and plastic.

As indicated previously (see Section 2.3), the shear stress in the concrete along a given edge of a slac is computed using equations (19) or (20). When the magnitude of the load is such that response is in the elastic range then the peak shear stress can be expressed as a function of the following parameters, i.e.,

$$\overline{v}_{up} = f(\overline{F}_1, \overline{t}_d, \overline{R}_1, \overline{y}_1, \overline{d})$$
 (59)

The magnitude of  $\overline{v}_{up}$  was determined numerically for each edge and the maximum of the two was used in the analysis. The variance of  $v_{up}$  was also determined numerically using the following expression:

$$V(v_{u}) = \left(\frac{\partial v_{u}}{\partial F_{1}}\right)^{2} V(F_{1}) + \left(\frac{\partial v_{u}}{\partial t_{d}}\right)^{2} V(t_{d}) + \left(\frac{\partial v_{u}}{\partial R_{1}}\right)^{2} V(R_{1}) + \left(\frac{\partial v_{u}}{\partial y_{1}}\right)^{2} V(y_{1})$$

$$+ \left(\frac{\partial v_{u}}{\partial d}\right)^{2} V(d) + 2 \left\{\frac{\partial v_{u}}{\partial R_{1}} \frac{\partial v_{u}}{\partial y_{1}} C(R_{1}, y_{1}) + \frac{\partial v_{u}}{\partial R_{1}} \frac{\partial v_{u}}{\partial d} C(R_{1}, d)\right\}$$

$$+ \frac{\partial v_{u}}{\partial y_{1}} \frac{\partial v_{u}}{\partial d} C(y_{1}, d)$$

$$(60)$$

Similarly, when the response is in the elasto-plastic range,

$$\overline{v}_{up} = f(\overline{F}_1, \overline{E}_d, \overline{R}_1, \overline{R}_2, \overline{y}_1, \overline{y}_2, \overline{d})$$
 (61)

$$V(v_{up}) = \left(\frac{\partial v_{up}}{\partial F_1}\right)^2 V(F_1) + \left(\frac{\partial v_{up}}{\partial t_d}\right)^2 V(t_d) + \left(\frac{\partial v_{up}}{\partial R_1}\right)^2 V(R_1) + \left(\frac{\partial v_{up}}{\partial R_2}\right)^2 V(R_2) + \left(\frac{\partial v_{up}}{\partial Y_2}\right)^2 V(Y_2) + \left(\frac{\partial v_{up}}{\partial Q_2}\right)^2 V(Q_2) + \left(\frac{\partial v_{up}}{\partial Q_2}\right)^2 V$$

When the response is in the plastic range,

$$\overline{v}_{up} = f(\overline{F}_1, \overline{t}_d, \overline{R}_2, \overline{d})$$
 (63)

$$V(v_{up}) = \left(\frac{\partial v_{up}}{\partial F_1}\right)^2 V(F_1) + \left(\frac{\partial v_{up}}{\partial f_d}\right)^2 V(f_d) + \left(\frac{\partial v_{up}}{\partial R_2}\right)^2 V(R_2) + \left(\frac{\partial v_{up}}{\partial f_d}\right)^2 V(f_d) + 2\left(\frac{\partial v_{up}}{\partial R_2}\right)^2 V(R_2)$$
(64)

In the above expressions the blast load parameters,  $F_1$  and  $t_d$ , are independent of the resistance function parameters  $R_1$ ,  $R_2$ ,  $y_1$ ,  $y_2$ ,  $y_m$ , and the mass of the slab,  $M_t$ . Although  $t_d$  is a function of  $F_1$ , the covariance using equation (48) turned out to be zero. The ultimate (failure) deflection,  $y_m$ , see equation (10), is independent of the other resistance function parameters because the span length "a" is taken as a constant.

In the above expressions for the variances of  $y_p$  and  $v_{up}$ , the constituent variances and covariances were determined in closed form. The partial

derivatives were obtained by means of numerical differentiation using

$$\frac{\partial y_{p}}{\partial x_{i}} = \frac{(y_{p})_{i+1} - (y_{p})_{i-1}}{2\Delta h}$$
 (65)

where  $x_i = (F_1, t_d, y_m, M_t, Q_t, Q_{ft}, y_{ft})$ 

 $\Delta h$  = differentiation increment,  $\Delta h$  was taken as 0.10 of one standard deviation for each of the variables.

## 3.7 PROBABILITY OF SHELTER FAILURE

For the reinforced concrete basement shelters considered in this study (see Figure 1), the first floor (overhead) slab is considered to be the primary structural component. Its collapse will result in casualties. The probability of failure of the slab was determined on the basis of the theory presented in Sections 3.1 to 3.3. Specific expressions used in the analysis are given.

# 3.7.1 Probability of Slab Failure

As indicated in Section 3.3, in the case of two failure modes, the probability of slab failure, P(F), is

$$P(F) = 1 - [1 - P(F_b)][1 - P(F_v)]$$
 (66)

if the modes are independent, and

$$P(F) = \max [P(F_b), P(F_v)]$$
 (67)

if the modes are highly correlated.

In equations (66) and (67),  $P(F_b)$  = probability of failure due to bending (flexure), see Section 3.7.2, and  $P(F_v)$  = probability of failure due to shear, see Section 3.7.2.

The real failure probability of the slab is between these two cases, i.e.,

$$\max [P(F_b), P(F_v)] \le P(F) \le 1 - [1 - P(F_b)][1 - P(F_v)]$$
 (68)

In the analysis performed in this study, both bounds were calculated and are included with the results.

# 3.7.2 Probabilities of Failure Due to Bending and Shear

In accordance with equation (39), probabilities of failure due to flexure and shear were computed using the following expressions:

$$P(F_b) = \Phi \left[ \frac{-\ln \left[ \frac{y_m}{y_p} \sqrt{1 + \Omega_{y_p}^2} \right]}{\ln \left[ (1 + \Omega_{y_p}^2)(1 + \Omega_{y_m}^2) \right]} \right]$$
(69)

where  $\mathbf{y}_{\mathrm{m}}$  and  $\mathbf{y}_{\mathrm{p}}$  were defined previously, see Section 3.5

 $\Omega_{y_p}$  = coefficient of variation of  $y_p$  $\Omega_{y_m}$  = coefficient of variation of  $y_m$ 

$$P(F_{v}) = \Phi \left[ \frac{-2n \left[ \frac{\overline{v}_{m}}{\overline{v}_{up}} \frac{\sqrt{1 + \Omega_{v_{up}}^{2}}}{\sqrt{1 + \Omega_{v_{m}}^{2}}} \right]}{2n \left[ (1 + \Omega_{v_{up}}^{2})(1 + \Omega_{v_{m}}^{2}) \right]} \right]$$
(70)

where  $v_m$  and  $v_{up}$  were defined previously, see equation (25) and Section 3.6  $\Omega_{v_{up}}$  = coefficient of variation of  $v_{up}$  = coefficient of variation of  $v_m$ .

## 3.8 PROBABILITY OF PEOPLE SURVIVAL

Casualty mechanisms considered in this study include primary air blast and debris impact due to the collapse of the first floor slab.

Body damage due to primary air blast results when the blast wave engulfs the body. In such a case, movement of different tissue masses produces shear waves which accelerate different organs and different parts of the same organ to different velocities. This results in strains and frequently in ruptures. Air-filled organs such as the lungs are especially susceptible to this type of damage. Data used to estimate the probability of survival from this effect were obtained from Reference 4 and are reproduced in Table 1.

TABLE 1. PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL FROM PRIMARY BLAST, P(Spb) (30 DAYS AFTER EXPOSURE)

Blast Overpressure	Probability of Survival (%)
40	97.6
50	88.0
60	72.0
70	51.0
80	33.0
100	11.0
120	3.0
150	0.6

Probability of survival against debris due to the collapse of the overhead (first floor) slab is determined using the theorem of total probabilities as

$$P(S_{sc}) = P(S|\overline{F})P(\overline{F}) + P(S|F)P(F)$$
 (71)

where  $P(S_{sc})$  = probability of people survival against structural collapse

P(S|F) = probability of people survival given that the shelter does not fail (collapse)

- $P(\overline{F})$  = probability of shelter (structure) survival
- P(S|F) = probability of people survival given that the shelter fails (collapses)
- P(F) = probability of shelter collapse = 1 P(F).

In equation (71) the probability of structural failure, P(F), is determined as described previously.  $P(S|\overline{F})$  and P(S|F) are determined as described in the following paragraphs.


Experimental results (Refs 17,18) indicate that two-way reinforced concrete slabs failing under blast loading do not generally break up into separate pieces. The concrete cracks throughout, but most of the large pieces remain loosely connected to the reinforcing steel. On the other hand, one-way slabs failing under blast loading do not remain connected, but rather break up catastrophically (Ref 2).

At overpressures prior to the total collapse of a slab (one-way or two-way), spallation is expected to occur and shelter occupants will be hit by spalled pieces of concrete. Injuries will, therefore, occur; however, these are not expected to be at the fatality level. It is assumed that prior to slab collapse no fatality level casualties are produced by slab debris and thus  $P(S|\overline{F}) = 1.0$ .

When people are uniformly distributed in all shelter areas and are lying down at the time of the attack, then P(S|F) can be directly related to the floor area unaffected by collapse. In other words, when an overhead slab collapses people in areas affected by the collapsed debris become fatality level casualties while people in areas unaffected by collapsed debris are survivors and/or injured.

For personnel shelters with two-way overhead slabs, a procedure for computing P(S|F) is given in Reference 5. A procedure for computing P(S|F) for shelters with one-way overhead slabs is described next.

Figure 8 shows an expediently upgraded basement shelter. The particular upgrading consists of a series of 6 in.  $\times$  10 in. beams and columns which are used to support the existing slab such that four smaller slabs are produced. For this concept, P(S|F) is computed as follows:



(b) Elevation, section A-A

Figure 8. Expedient upgrading, type C.

$$P(S|F) = S_f = \frac{A_f - A_a}{A_f}$$
 (72)

where  $A_f$  = total, clear floor area

A<sub>a</sub> = floor area that would be affected by debris from the collapse of the slab.

For the case where a = 12 ft and b = 24 ft, the spacing of the beams is such that a' = 4.08 ft and b' = 10.08 ft, then

$$A_f = (12 - 0.83)(24 - 0.83) = 258.81 \text{ sq ft}$$

$$A_a = 4(4.08)(10.08) = 164.51 \text{ sq ft}$$

$$S_f = 0.36.$$

## 3.9 COMBINED PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL

It is reasonable to assume that an individual injured from several weapon effects would have a lesser probability of survival then if the injury was due to one of the effects. Information on how the simultaneous action of several effects from a single weapon combine to result in a probability of survival is not known at this time. For this reason, survival probabilities from different effects are combined in this report as independent phenomena. Thus the probability of people survival, P(S), against primary blast and slab collapse is computed as

$$P(S) = P(S_{pb})P(S_{SC})$$
 (73)

#### 4. DESCRIPTION OF SHELTERS

## 4.1 BASIC STRUCTURE

Reinforced concrete shelters considered in this study were illustrated in Figure 1. This is a portion of an engineered basement of a low-rise reinforced concrete building. The first floor slab is a one-way reinforced concrete slab with its top surface at grade. The slab is simply supported along interior reinforced concrete walls. Twelve designs were performed (see Table 2) for several combinations of design live load and span length. The design live load ranges from 50 to 250 psf and the span (short direction) from 12 ft to 20 ft.

## 4.2 EXPEDIENT UPGRADING SCHEMES

Four types of expedient upgrading schemes were considered with each of the twelve slabs given in Table 2. As illustrated in Figure 9, scheme A is the basic, conventional slab and schemes B through E represent expedient upgrading schemes in the order of increasing strength. Upgrading is accomplished by reducing the basic slab to a series of smaller slabs. This would be done by providing supports along the dash lines shown in Figure 9. Supports that may be used for this purpose were shown in Figure 3.

### 4.3 ANALYSIS DATA

Table 3 contains structural data used in the analysis of this set of shelters. The various cases and expedient upgrading schemes are identified in Table 2 and Figure 9.

As indicated earlier, the basic slab was designed as a one-way slab. By making use of the temperature reinforcement which is placed orthogonal to the main reinforcement, each slab in each expedient upgrading scheme was analyzed as a two-way slab. In Figure 9,  $A_{\rm S3}$  is the main reinforcement and  $A_{\rm e1}$  is the temperature reinforcement.

TABLE 2. STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS FOR ONE-WAY SLAB\* (REF 3)

						Case					F	6
Design	-		5	-	9	و	-	8	6	2	=	4
Design Live Load,	20	20	20	08	80	80	125	125	125	250	250	250
psf		4	50	12	16	20	12	16	20	15	16	50
Spans a (11)	3. <b>4</b>	35	6	24	32	40	24	35	40	24	32	40
Span, D (10) Effective Depth,	; <del>-</del>	4.75	7.75	4.50	6.25	7.85	5.22	7.80	10.49	6.74	9.72	12,83
d (in.) Total Depth,	ĸ	5,75	8.75	5.50	7.25	0.6	6.25	0.6	11.50	7.75	10.75	14.0
t (in.) Main Reinforcement	0.19	0.23	0.27	0.22	0.26	0.30	0.26	0,35	0.47	0.35	0.47	0.62
A <sub>53</sub> , (in.)*/ft Temperature	0.11	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.15	0.19	0.13	0.20	0.25	0.16	0.23	0.31
Reinforcement, A <sub>S1</sub> , (in.) <sup>2</sup> /ft												

Edge conditions: Simply supported.

Ultimate compressive strength of concrete,  $f_c^*$  = 3000 psi.

Yield strength of reinforcing steel,  $f_y$  = 60,000 psi.

\*See Figure 1 for slab configuration.




Figure 9. Basic slab and expedient upgrading schemes.

As shown in Table 3, the effective depth of slab, reinforcing steel areas, ultimate strengths of concrete and steel, and the capacity reduction factor are treated as random variables. The other parameters, i.e., span lengths and the slab thickness, are treated as constants. Coefficients of variation were determined based on data given in Chapter 7 of Reference 5. Coefficients of variation of peak overpressure and load duration, see equation (1), were taken as 1.0%.

In Table 3, parameters "a" and "b" are center to center of supports dimensions, while "a $_{\rm c}$ " and "b $_{\rm c}$ " are clear span dimensions after the placement of expedient upgrading supports. Values of "a $_{\rm c}$ " and "b $_{\rm c}$ " were used in computing S $_{\rm f}$  by means of equation (72).

In computing  $S_f$  for the basic slab (scheme A, Figure 9),  $A_f$  and  $A_a$ , see equation (72), were assumed not to be the same. In computing  $A_a$ , it was assumed that the portion of the floor bounded by the walls and a line 6 in. from the walls would be essentially free from debris effects. Thus for this one case only

$$A_{f} = (b - 0.83)(a - 0.83)$$

$$A_{a} = (b - 1.83)(a - 1.83)$$
(74)

TABLE 3. REINFORCED CONCRETE SLAB ANALYSIS DATA

Parameter Parameter	V	m	ese Lesse		ш	¥	8	Case	0		A	<b>8</b>	Se 3		닏
* 4 4 g+	12.0 24.0 4.0 7.5	12.0 12.0 7.0 7.5	6.0 12.0 4.0 7.5 5.0	12.0 7.5 5.0	0.047	16.0 32.0 4.75 6.71 5.75	16.0 16.0 4.75 6.71 5.75	8.0 16.0 4.75 6.71 5.75	8.0 16.0 4.75 6.71 5.75	8.0 8.0 4.75 6.71 5.75	20.0 40.0 7.75 5.08 8.75	20.0 20.0 7.75 5.08 8.75	10.0 20.0 7.75 5.08 8.75	10.0 20.0 7.75 5.08 8.75	10.0 10.0 7.75 5.08 8.75
A <sub>S1</sub> (in.) <sup>2</sup> /ft A <sub>S3</sub> (in.) <sup>2</sup> /ft Ω <sub>A</sub> (x)	0.10 0.19 2.4	0.10 0.19 2.4	0.10	0.19 0.10 2.4	0.19 0.10 2.4	0.11 0.23 2.4	0.11 0.23 2.4	0.11 0.23 2.4	0.23 0.11 2.4	0.23 0.11 2.4	0.19	0.19 0.27 2.4	0.19 0.27 2.4	0.27	0.27 0.19 2.4
\$c (#) \$c (#) \$c (#)	10.17 22.17 0.13	10.17	4.08 10.08 0.36	4.08 10.17 0.36	4.08 4.08 0.47	14.17 30.17 0.10	14.17 14.08 0.16	6.08 14.08 0.28	6.08 14.17 0.28	6.08 6.08 0.37	18.17 38.17 0.08	18.17 18.08 0.12	8.08 18.08 0.22	8.08 18.17 0.22	8.08 8.08 0.29
	4	80	Case 4			M	E	Case 5			A	<b>E</b>	Case 6	Q	
**************************************	12.0 24.0 4.50 6.94 5.5	0.51 0.54 0.98 0.98	6.0 12.0 4.50 6.94 5.5	6.0 12.0 4.50 6.94 5.5		16.0 32.0 6.25 5.7 7.25	16.0 16.0 6.25 5.7 7.25	8.0 16.0 6.25 5.7 7.25	8.0 16.0 6.25 5.7 7.25	8.0 8.0 6.25 7.25	20.0 40.0 7.85 5.05	20.0 20.0 7.85 5.05	10.0 20.0 7.85 5.05 9.0	10.0 20.0 7.85 5.05	10.01 10.01 7.85 9.05
A <sub>S1</sub> (in.) <sup>2</sup> /ft A <sub>S3</sub> (in.) <sup>2</sup> /ft O <sub>A</sub> (x)	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.22	0.22	0.15 0.26 2.4	0.15 0.26 2.4	0.15 0.26 2.4	0.26 0.15 2.4	0.26 0.15 2.4	0.19 0.30 2.4	0.19 0.30 2.4	0.19	0.30	0.30 0.19 2.4
\$ (#) \$ (#) \$ (#)	10.17 22.17 0.13	10.17 10.08 0.21	4.08 10.08 0.36	4.08 10.17 0.36	10.17	14.17 30.17 0.10	14.17 14.08 0.16	6.08 14.08 0.28	6.08 14.17 0.28	6.08 6.08 0.37	18.17 38.17 0.08	18.17 18.08 0.12	8.08 18.08 0.22	8.08 18.17 0.22	8.08 8.08 0.29
Ultimate dynamic, compressive strength of Ultimate dynamic yield strength of steel,	ic, compri	essive si strength	trength o	concre fdy =	-5 <sub>6</sub> 6	= 3,9063	ksi.		Coeffic	Coefficient of variation of Coefficient of variation of	variatio	n of fdc; n of fdy;	# # a' a'	17.58%. 9.22%.	
Unit weight of concrete, w = 150 pcr. Capacity reduction factor, $\phi$ = 1.0.	concrete tion fact	or, 4 =	. 0. 1.0.						Coeffic	ient of	variatio	n of ¢;	Coefficient of variation of $\phi$ ; $\Omega_{\psi}$ = 4.7%.	<del>} 2</del>	

TABLE 3. (Cont.)

Acto			Case 7					Case 8				:	Case 9		
Parameter	V			0	<u> </u>	Y	8	ပ	0		A	8	3	a	ш
a (ft)	12.0	12.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	16.0 32.0	16.0	8.0 16.0	8.0 16.0	8 8 0 0	20.0 40.0	20.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
d (in.)	5.22	5.22	5.22	5.22	5.22	7.8	7.8	7.8	7.8	7.8	10.49	10.49	10.49	10.49	10.49
(in.)	6.25	6.25	6,25	6.25	6.25	9.0	9.0	9.0	0.6	9.0	11.5	11.5	11.5	11.5	11.5
Acl (in.)2/ft	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.26	0.26	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.35	0.35	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.47	0.47
As3 (in.)2/ft	0.26 2.4	0.26	0.26 2.4	0.13 2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4
A. (fg.)	10.17	10.17	4.08	4.08	4.08	14.17	14.17	80*9	<b>6.</b> 08	6.08	18.17	18.17	8.08	8.08	80.0
Sec. (1)	22.17	10.08	10.08 0.36	10.17	4.08	30.17 0.10	14.08 0.16	14.08 0.28	14.17	6.08	38.17 0.08	18.08 0.12	0.22	0.22	0.29
•							. !								
			Case 10					Case 11		•		4		2	L
	V		اد			V	æ	دا	0	الد	4	<b>a</b>	اد		
a (ft)	12.0	12.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	16.0	16.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	20.0	20.0	10.0	10.0	10.01
b (ft)	24.0	12.0	12.0	12.0	0.9	32.0	16.0	16.0	0.9	8°0	12.0	12.83	12.83	12.83	12.83
d (in.)	5.47	5.47	5.47		5.47	4.56	4.56	4.56	4.56	4.56	4.06	4.06	4.06	4.06	4.06
t (in.)	7.75	7.75	7.75	7.75	7.75	10,75	10,75	10.75	10.75	10.75	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0	14.0
A., (in.) <sup>2</sup> /ft	0.16	0.16	0.16	0,35	0.35	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.47	0.47	0.31	0.31	0.31	29.0	0.62
A <sub>53</sub> (in.) <sup>2</sup> /ft	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.16	0.16 2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	0.23	0.23 2.4	0.62 2.4	0.62 2.4	0.62 2.4	2.4	2.4
•		. ;				;	;	ć	9	8	10 17	10 17	a	ď	æ
ac (ft)	70.01	10.08	10.08 80.08	10.17	4 4 80. 80.	30.17	14.08	14.08	14.17	9.09	38.17	18.08	18.08	18.17	88
25.00	0.13	0.21	0.36	0.36	0.47	0.10	0.16	0.28	0.28	0.37	0.08	0.12	0.22	0.22	0.29
Ultimate dynamic, compressive strength of	ic, compr	essive s	trength o	1	concrete, fic	= 3.9063	1 ks1.		Coeffic	Coefficient of variation of	variation of	on of fdc;	# "	17.58%.	
Ultimate dynamic yield strength of steel,	ic yield	strength	of stee	<sup>†</sup> dy	* X4°0.1X *	KS1.								•	
Unit weight of concrete, w = 150 pcf.	concrete	<u>.</u>	0 pcf.						Confes	Coefficient of variation of	variatio	n of h	1: Q. = 4.7%	7%.	
Capacity reduction factor, \$ = 1.0.	tion fact	0T, <del>v</del>	·						200		3		-		

#### 5. PEOPLE SURVIVABILITY RESULTS

This chapter contains a summary of results on the probability of survival of people when located in expediently upgraded, reinforced concrete basements and subjected to the blast effects of a 1-MT surface burst. Casualty mechanisms include debris from the collapse of the overhead slab and primary blast. Results were generated using a computer program which was developed during the previous study (Ref 5) and modified and extended in the course of this study. Specific shelters considered are described in Chapter 4.

This chapter explains how the results were produced. Case IA is used for illustration. The results are summarized in Table 4. A complete set of detailed results is included in Appendix C.

Case 1A (see Table 3) is the basic conventional, one-way slab over the basement designed to resist its own weight plus a live load of 50 psf. Its plan dimensions are 12 ft by 24 ft and the total thickness is 5.0 in. When subjected to a uniformly distributed blast loading over its surface, the possible failure modes are flexure and shear. Probabilities of failure based on flexure and shear when acting independent of each other are shown in Figure 10. Note that shear and flexure are both important in producing failure and, therefore, both need to be considered. However, since we do not know how these two failure modes correlate then the best that can be done is to bound the actual failure probability as discussed in Sections 3.3 and 3.7.1. Thus, using equations (66) and (67), the upper and lower bounds on the failure probability for this slab were computed and are shown in Figure 11. Corresponding bounds on the probability of people survival are shown in Figure 12. They were determined using equation (71).

It is useful to compare the effectiveness of the various expedient upgrading schemes on people survivability. This is done for Case 1 in Table 5 which contains overpressure ranges at the 90% and 50% probability of survival levels.

TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF RESULTS, REINFORCED CONCRETE BASEMENT SHELTERS

	ĝ	Gu a											6.928				
71	Louer be	nd, Louer	3.382	5.5535	13.0697	11.5696 11.2096	19.9601 21.1852	3.9 <b>68</b> 8.2291	4.9125 3.5710	10.5324 9.2541	9.1341	15.7225 15.3991	6.3995	6.5316 5.0898	15.37 <b>0</b> 3 9.2594	14.3151 10.8465	23.57 <b>86</b> 21.2451
= ,	Opper bound.	Cupper boun	2.6355 6.3886	4.1761	11.7252	10.4177	18.2087	2.0329	3.1979	9.2065	6.9159	14.1976	8.8425	4.7463	13.1202	12.2459	21.0344
2	1 1 ure (U)	10%	3.7174	5.4216	13.5680	12.1021	20.5761	3.1867	4.4858	11.0625	9.7203	16.4177	5.1317	7,1372	16.3247	15.3508	24.5941
	b1114 of	of People 50x	2.4214	3.8618	3.5971	3.5682	5.5580	2.0632	3.1886	3.7067	3.8870	4.8694	2.926	4.6237	4.5570 16.1379	3.8862 15.1216	5.0458
æ	Probet 16%	Prob.	<b>9.3475</b> 2.6674	6.4413 4.2493	0.6967 12.6363	0.6917 10.6486	6.9879 18.7255	8.3649 2.653	3.2526	0.6489 9.4218	8.1783	6.8838 14.5411	6.4393 2.8711	4.8114	13.3486	0.6947 12.4745	6.8379
<b>\</b>		Š	6.13 6.13		96.3	98.	4.4		9.16	9.0	88.0	.37	9.0	6.12	 	 	22
٥		As3 sqin/ft	6.196	96.	• . 19 • . 19	28	 53	⊕. 6.03 9.03 9.03	6.236 6.236	6.236 6.236	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		9.276 9.278	6.276 6.276	6.276 9.276	96.19	.19
ດ		Asi sqin/ft	38	38	••• ••• •••	. 198	.198	0.110		9.11.	6.236 6.236	6.236 6.236	0.130	0.190	• . 19 • . 19 • . 19	6.276 6.276	6.876
4		S. C.	22	88 88			 		 		 S	S. 60.	8.75	8.75 8.75	80.00 27.75	<b>8.75</b>	<b>K K</b>
<b>7</b> )		<b>1</b>	88	28	88	22	88	44 65.	44 84 85 85	£.4 87.4	4.75	44 66	, 5.5. . 5.5.	7.75	£	\$5.7 St. 7	K. 5
7		<b>~</b> §	~~	N. S.	ă.	ag.		ห่ห่		## ##		**	**	žž	žž	22	===
		33	~ ~	<b>4</b> 4	•••	44	••	22	33				żż	ž	22	::	===
		¥	35	20	35	32	152 153	33	22	20	222	<b>KK</b>	33	328	20	## ##	22

Columns 8-13 are overpressures at corresponding probabilities of structural collapse and people survival. Columns 8, 9 and 10 are upper bound values. Columns 11, 12 and 13 are lower bound values. Case numbers (column 1) ending with a "2" refer to the probability of failure of the shelter. Case numbers ending with a "3" refer to the probability of people survival for the same case. Note:

TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF RESULTS, REINFORCED CONCRETE BASEMENT SHELTERS (continued)

į,

Ť,

ĩ

**?**,

				<del>-</del>	,·											
•												7.88				
Ser boss	C. Louer be	3.5969	5.41 8.41 8.22 8.22	16.9971	7.000	25.0342 27.1292	4.0 84 88	6.7172 5.6691	13.673	13.193	22. 25. 25. 25. 25. 25. 25. 25. 25. 25.	3.5. 3.5. 3.0. 3.0. 3.0.	2.5 2.5 2.5	5. 8. 8.5 8.5	2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3	
ser bound, Louar 10%   50%	Upper boun	3.4982	5.5311	18.8276 1.2805	13.4807	23.5315 1.6566	 	5.3773 6.861	14.8561	  	23.C3 X3.C3	3.188 6.4714	5. i 50 0. 7 28	7.0 8.7 8.5	 	28.98 1.151.1
Fatiure (Upper	Survival C	4.9837	6.9844	17.462	15.4162	26.33	5.8134	7.3624	17.5869	15.9473	25.55	9.0	7.7833	17.0005	16.3073	8.438
J 50 195 17	of People Sex	2.2072 6.7164	3.8430	5.2563	4.7128	2.2650	2. 98.07 2. 0.187	4.6438	4.4417	16.9436	4.928	10.75862	4.7823	17.5514		2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3
Probab 16x	Prop.	9.3891 3.5323	6.6345 5.5968	0.8744 15.5941	6.7852 13.6986	24.1587	9.4108 3.3746		6.8692 15.1473	13.6436	23.7692	3.1864	5.2144	14.9613		5. E723
	Ş		 	<b>88</b>	%% %%		::	9.16	22	22	ë.	** \$8	. 18 9. 18	NN	22	RE.
	As3	22.0 22.0 0.0	<b>3</b> 000	900 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800			338	3.8. 3.8.	23	83	33	**	38	**	***	 88
	Pain/ft	••		***	88. 88. 88.		56	35	9.75	38.	99 99 99 99 99	***	*** ***	 88		
	Ç S	23.5	8.5. 8.5.	88	33	33.	 88	žX.	Z.S.	KK.	3,3	88	88	88	88	23
	<b>(1)</b>	30	33	24 20	33	2.4 2.2	ž.X.	28	ZX.	ģģ	ŽŽ.	*** ***	***	88	22	44
	25	źź	ää	ijġ	ğġ	<b></b>	##	<b>#</b> #	22	<b>4</b> 4	••	<b>\$</b> \$	ŔŔ	źż.	żż	22
	3	ää	22	<b></b>	••	••	<b>#</b> #	##			•••	**	28	22	22	\$2
	30	13	##	\$5	<b>\$</b> §	44	33	22	22	28	80	**	##	25	<b>8</b> 8	86

TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF RESULTS, REINFORCED CONCRETE BASEMENT SHELTERS (continued)

	~					- <b></b>		**************************************		200	10 m	20x	ž
	-3	35	-3	-3	Asi Sqin/ft	A33 8418/ft	3	Prob.	of People	Service!	Upper boun	d.Louer b	Ç N
22	22	7.0	88			932.0	5.0	5.4485	2.8377 6.2255	6.6857	4.9846	6.688. 4.585.	
22 22	22	žų.	\$ N.		6.13	990.	 	7.826	13.5691	9.6	7.6963	8.9156 7.9616	
au.		30	<b>8</b> 8.	6.00		• 260 • 260	96.36	8.9235 21.6698	5.5328	23.7945	21.1266	20.735	
22		24	88.8	6.25	• .266 • .266	 88	9.38	19.6361	4.4943	21.1267	18.6076	20.5016	
20		•••	5.28		998	6.13	4.4	33.4509	6.1555	36.0448	32.5954	35.54.5 36.9628	
92 22	22	##	22	<b>33</b>		0.350		5.9986	3.6928	8.8478	5.9284 9.5753	7.5853	
 22	##	22		<b>33</b>		9.350	9.16	9.5162	5.9694	12.4974	9.3681	11.2264	
RD.			88	<b>88</b>	**************************************	9.350 9.350	22.8	25.8785	4.9628 30.4408	29.2357	25.3434	28.9557	
<b>22</b>		22	2.2	<b>88</b>	ek.	**************************************		0.8239	4.8167	26.6122	22.8869	28.0457 0.7585	
20			88	<b>33</b>	ŠĶ.	28.	6.3	1.0288	6.1452	4.678	39.6696	30.38	
22	žž	**	10.40	11.50		 6.4.	22	6.9519	3.8485	11.5170	6.870	9.3895	16.139
22	żż	żż	55	11.50	S.S.	25	9.18	10.9322	4.928	15.5914	10.70		
RR	<b>33</b>	ää	55	11.50	•.256 •.256	£	 88	0.965g 29.8769	5.6123 36.0053	34.5960	29.3995	%. 6.5 8.5 8.4	
22	22	88	*** ***	11.50	÷÷	Six.	22.0	0.8150 26.6348	36.92	31.3310	25. 1829 0.9933	26.38 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00	
20	22	22	33 55	11.50	££.	950	22	1.6311	6.1963	28.983	£	2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3	
Ì		-	-		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,								

TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF RESULTS, REINFORCED CONCRETE BASEMENT SHELTERS (concluded)

**i**.

ľ,

1.

2.

5-87 1 5-8-1 11 4409 B. 7461 10 4663 10 5641 1		٠.	- ·							35	Fellure (Upper	Part Port	2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	<b>*</b>
Column   C	3	-3	3.	-3	<b>.</b> ĝ	# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #	A11/21	*	4 0 × 0	Peop 1	Survival	Chper bou	i –	( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
### 1	33	22	ŽŽ	***	r.	33	350	50	25. 27.9	3.4848	11.4409	8.7001 0.6763	10.4663	
6.         6.         7.7	#E	22	23	77	۲.۲. ۲.۲.	33	356	25.	9.888 13.6365	4.9654	16.4330	13.4529	15.5109	
6. 6. 6. 7.7 7.75 0.350 0.150 0.38 0.176 1.73550 35.1971 31.0362 35.1937 1.2799 35.1971 31.0362 35.1937 1.2799 35.1971 31.0362 35.1939 1.2799 35.1939 1.2799 35.1939 1.2799 35.1939 1.2799 35.1939 1.2799 35.1939 1.2799 35.1939 1.2799 35.1939 1.2799 35.1939 1.2799 35.1939 1.2799 35.1939 1.2799 35.1939 1.2799 35.1939 1.2799 35.1939 1.2799 35.1939 1.2799	<u> </u>	44	23		£.K.	33	386.	M.W.	1.9952	5.4515	39.7587	36.5712	40.5148	
6. 6. 74 7.75 0.350 0.150 0.47 41.357 6.763 51.3176 5.7275 1.9416 51.3136 1.9416 51.3136 1.9416 51.3136 1.9416 51.3136 1.9416 51.3136 1.9416 51.3136 1.9416 51.3136 1.9416 51.3136 1.9416	## ##	46	33		K.	336	33	XX	9.8766 32.5211	4.9679	35.1971	31.8362	35.1637	
16.         36.         37.         10.75         0.470         0.10         0.705         15.7264         14.1176         9.8966         12.7274         15.7274	<u> 25</u>	44	ij	-	£	.350	33		1.1877	6.7693		55.7285	51.3136	
16.         9.72         10.75         0.230         0.470         0.16         15.5876         25.5811         20.6677         15.3740         18.543           16.         9.72         10.75         0.230         0.470         0.16         15.5870         19.2561         20.6677         15.3740         18.543           16.         9.72         10.75         0.470         0.28         0.9827         5.3944         45.760         41.587         41.4811           16.         9.72         10.75         0.470         0.29         0.29         40.650         41.565         41.4811         11.616         10.235         41.4811         11.616         10.235         41.4811         11.616         10.235         41.4811         11.616         10.235         41.4811         11.616	## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ##	22	ÄÄ	-	5.51 2.61	6.230	\$. \$. \$.	:::	10.0168	5.7264	14.3176	9.8986	12.7277	
8. 16. 9.72 10.75 0.230 0.470 0.28 41.3994 45.7666 41.562 10.75 10	20	22	22	-	5.5 £.6	6.23. 6.23.	6.4.	99	6.8766 15.5876	5.5581	20.0607	15.3740	18.5543	
8.         9.72         11.1565         36.5474         41.4161           8.         9.72         10.75         0.470         0.230         0.23         77.6675         4.0632         41.1565         36.5474         41.4161           8.         9.72         10.75         0.470         0.230         0.37         11.189         6.7244         41.4161           80.         40.         13.23         14.00         0.310         0.620         0.97         11.189         6.7244         41.426         12.436           80.         13.23         14.00         0.310         0.620         0.06         11.3657         13.466         11.3657         13.466	22 22		22	99	## %	6.23 6.23 6.33 6.33	£	88	41.399	5.3994	45.7606	41.5028	46.8368	
8. 4. 8.72 10.75 0.470 0.230 0.37 11.189 6.7324 6.29595 0.37 11.189 6.7324 6.29595 0.37 11.189 6.7324 6.29595 0.37 11.365 0.37	32		22	99	33 85	54.	6.836	22	37.0675	4.8696	41.1565	36.5474	41.4161	
20. 12. 123 14.00 0.310 0.620 0.00 11.3657 11.3657 12.4866 16.3337 13.4866 16.2337 13.4866 16.2337 13.4866 16.2337 13.4866 16.2337 13.4866 16.2337 13.4866 16.2337 13.4866 16.2337 13.4866 16.2337 13.4866 16.2337 13.4866 16.2337 13.4866 16.2337 13.4866 16.2337 13.4866 16.2337 13.4866 16.2337 13.4866 16.2337 13.4866 16.2337 13.4866 16.233 13.4866 16.233 13.4866 16.233 13.4866 16.233 13.4866 16.233 13.4866 16.233 13.4866 16.233 13.4866 16.233 13.4866 16.233 13.4866 16.233 13.4866 16.233 13.4866 16.233 13.4866 16.233 13.4866 16.233 13.4866 16.233 13.4866 15.233 13.4866 15.233 13.4866 13.4	20		**	-	## # # #		6.23		1.1189	6.7324		62.9595	4.6703	
20. 18. 13. 14. 00 0.13 0.18 0.18 17. 19. 17. 17. 18. 17. 17. 18. 18. 18. 18. 18. 18. 18. 18. 18. 18	33	ŔŔ	**		### ###	6.310	689.	22	0.8146	6.0576	18.4669	11.3657	15.4966	26.2212
10. 20. 12.03 14.00 0.310 0.22 0.9985 S. 9336 S2.6847 47.4017 S4.8741 10. 20. 12.831 14.00 0.310 0.22 45.3765 S4.6388 S2.6847 47.4017 S4.8741 10. 20. 12.831 14.00 0.310 0.32 0.310 0.32 40.4370 11.2554 10.2310 11.2554 10.2310 11.2554 11.25	<b>88</b>	žž	82	~~	22		689.	51.0	17.8937	5.4984	24.9034	17.6726	28.16.4 7.496	
10. 80. 12.63 14.00 0.620 0.310 0.82 0.8311 5.4810 47.6168 41.9775 48.4370 10. 80. 12.63 14.00 0.620 0.310 0.22 41.6042 40.5822 47.6168 11.9775 14.00 0.620 0.310 0.29 11.1450 6.8378 11.0475 14.048 14.048	<u> </u>	22	ŻŹ		22		23	<b>8</b> 8.	6.9985 45.3765	5.936	52.6847	47.4017	22.52	
10. 10. 12.83 14.00 0.620 0.310 0.29 1.1450 6.2378 1.16165 1.1650	38	==	22	## ##	22			 21.03	4.6811	5.4816 49.5822	47.6168	4.973	# # # # # # # # #	
	<b>30</b>	22	22	33 55	22	923	9.310	22	1.1456	6.2878		1.5185	7.000	




Figure 10. Failure probabilities due to flexure and shear, Case 1A.





Figure 11. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) Case 1A.



Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) Case 1A. Figure 12.

TABLE 5. OVERPRESSURE RANGES AT THE 90% AND 50% PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL (CASE 1)

Probability		Expedia	nt Upgrading	Scheme	
Level	A	B	С	D	Ε
90%	0.39-2.64	0.55-4.18	0.87-11.73	0.86-10.42	1.58-18.20
50%	2.77-6.60	4.57-12.90	12.47-26.10	11.21-	19.96-

For schemes D and E the upper bonds are not included at the 50% probability of survival level. The reason is that the curves are very flat after a certain point, and do not intersect the particular probability value in the overpressure range of interest (see Figure 12, for example). This is also the reason why numbers are missing in certain columns in Table 4. It is evident from these results that expedient upgrading can be very effective in providing protection. The 50% survival probability at 2.77 psi for the basic slab becomes almost 20 psi when upgrading scheme E is employed. Similar trends will be noted for the other slabs.

If it is a matter of choosing between two basements for expedient upgrading, then obviously the one that was designed for a higher live load should be chosen assuming that both are in good physical condition and the design loads are known for each. The key item in expedient upgrading is the correct design of the supporting system and its correct implementation.

It is recommended that experimental studies be initiated whose objective would be to generate experimental data on the response of reinforced concrete slabs subjected to dynamic loadings. We need experimental data in the response range approaching failure. Available experimental data on the shear failure of slabs, the distribution of reactive forces along the supports, and the interaction of flexure and shear prior to and at the point of failure, is especially limited at this time. Reliable data would aid in the development of accurate failure theories and also in the development of design and implementation criteria for expedient upgrading schemes.

Since the upper and lower bounds on the failure probability are fairly far apart for most cases studied (see Figure 12), it becomes useful to

0

determine the correlation that exists between the two failure modes and then to determine the actual failure probability. This was not done in this study because the methodology for doing this was not available. For the present, it is believed that the lower bound should be used as a conservative measure of the probability of people survival.

## 6. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 6.1 SUMMARY

Ü

1

C

The study reported here was concerned with predicting the probability of survival of people located in expediently upgraded, conventional basements when subjected to the blast effects produced by the detonation of a 1-MT weapon near the ground surface. Two categories of basements are considered, i.e., basements of engineered buildings and basements of single family residences.

The first category includes basements of low-rise engineered buildings. The basement walls are unexposed and the first floor slab (the slab over the basement) is at grade. The first floor slab is the primary structural component for the basement as far as protection from the blast is concerned. Its collapse will result in casualties due to debris impact and blast winds and pressures entering shelter areas when the shelter envelope is breached.

The slab over the basement was designed as a one-way reinforced concrete system for live loads of 50, 80, 125, and 250 psf and span lengths of 12, 16, and 20 ft. This includes a total of twelve conventional basements having a representative range of use classes. Each of the twelve basements was analyzed as expediently upgraded using four different upgrading schemes. Upgrading is accomplished by providing supports that reduce the effective span of the slab and by blocking off all openings into the basement. This resulted in sixty shelters of different strengths which include the conventional, unupgraded slab as the base case.

The second category includes four conventional wood frame residences with full basements. These basements were also analyzed as expediently upgraded. Again, upgrading consisted of providing intermediate supports for the joist floor system, blocking off all openings into the basement, and mounding the building with soil up to the first floor level, about 2 to 3 ft from grade. Expedient upgrading included "studwall" and "post and beam" concepts. Six shelters were analyzed. First, each basement was analyzed

as upgraded using the studwall scheme; second, two of the basements were reanalyzed using the "post and beam" concept.

A probability of survival function was developed for each shelter and each upgrading scheme. The procedure used to accomplish this consists of two parts. The first is a probabilistic structural analysis which determines the probability of failure to the shelter envelope. The second part is a probabilistic people survival analysis which considers two casualty producing mechanisms, i.e., debris impact and associated effects from the collapse of the primary structural system and primary blast. The probability of structural failure is made use of in computing the probability of survival against debris effects.

The analysis method briefly described above was formulated in the course of this study and the previous effort (Ref 5), and a portion of it was computerized. The computer program is capable of analyzing reinforced concrete shelters of the type discussed previously in this chapter, and of predicting the probability of survival for shelter occupants against the effects of blast.

#### 6.2 CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the study conducted and results obtained, the following conclusions are made:

- (1) A method for computing the probability of failure of structures (Ref 15) was examined and applied to the analysis of personnel shelters. This method is capable of condsidering all structural components making up the structure and the respective failure modes of each component. This method is the most rational that is available at this time and the results are believed to be the most reliable of those produced in this subject area to date.
- (2) Expedient upgrading can be very effective in increasing the live saving potential of conventional reinforced concrete basements. Conventional basements with one-way reinforced concrete overhead floor systems designed for a live load of 50 psf can be expediently upgraded to result in a probability of survival of 50% at 20 psi. Slabs originally designed for a higher live load, 125 psf for example, can be easily upgraded to result in a probability of survival of 50% beyond 30 psi. It can, therefore, be supposed that two-way floor

systems, which are generally stronger than one-way floor system, have the capacity of providing even greater protection when effectively upgraded.

- (3) Conventional wood framed basements are capable of being expediently upgraded to provide protection beyond 5 psi at a probability of survival of 50% or better.
- (4) The analysis procedure presented here is sufficiently general and can be readily extended to include the influence of other hazards which accompany a nuclear weapon attack, i.e., prompt nuclear radiation, fires, and fallout radiation.
- (5) A capability should be formulated and included in the analysis to study the effects of evasive action taken by shelter occupants on the probability of survival.

#### 6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

The previous effort (Ref 5) and the study reported here have been very useful in formulating the people survivability problem on a rational probabilistic basis. The approach is very promising and if allowed to develop further will produce a reliable computational tool for the rating of shelter spaces, evaluating alternative shelter systems, and for performing damage limiting studies. With this end in mind, two tasks are recommended.

#### 6.3.1 Experimental Task

There is a need for experimental studies to be initiated to generate data for a better understanding of how reinforced concrete structural components respond in the range approaching failure, i.e., what failure modes are introduced, how they interact with each other for different slabs, what is the influence of boundary conditions and loadings on the modes of failure. Experimental studies should be conducted to generate data capable of improving the current formulations of the following failure criteria:

- Failure criteria for horizontally oriented reinforced concrete slabs; one-way and two-way floor systems
- Failure criteria for vertically oriented slabs in contact with the soil; basement walls
- · Failure criteria for columns and beams.

A test plan, outlining the number of experiments that would be needed to produce the necessary data cannot be produced at this time. The first task would be a review of all available experimental data on this subject. With this task completed it would be possible to outline a preliminary test plan.

### 6.3.2 Analytic Task

The computer program developed thus far must be further developed to include the capability to analyze the following structural systems and to include related aspects:

# (a) Individual Structural Components

In addition to the library of structural components included in the computer program at this time, the following should be implemented:

Flat slabs
Flat plates
One-way slabs
Beams (steel, reinforced concrete)
Columns (steel, reinforced concrete)
Composite steel and concrete systems
Masonry systems.

# (b) <u>Weapon Effects Hazards</u>

In addition to blast and debris effects included in the computer program at this time, other nuclear weapon effects and indirect hazards should be included.

Prompt nuclear radiation Fallout radiation Ground shock Fires.

# (c) <u>Casualty Data</u>

Available data for estimating the level of casualty experienced by individuals against the various hazards should be reviewed with the object of making the current casualty predicting process more reliable.

All of the aspects outlined would be considered within the probabilistic framework outlined in Section 3.

#### APPENDIX A

# PROBABILITY OF PEOPLE SURVIVAL IN THE BASEMENT OF A WOOD FRAME RESIDENCE

Procedure used in determining the probability of people survival in basements of single-family, wood frame residences is presented in this appendix. The particular building analyzed is the "Dunes" house (Ref 20). This is a one-story, single-family frame residence with a full basement. The floor system over the basement is approximately 1 ft above grade.

The analysis described is for a basement expediently upgraded by proiding stud walls in the basement as additional supports for the floor system, blocking windows and doors, and mounding the structure on the outside up to the first floor level.

Two cases are considered, i.e., with and without soil cover (1 ft depth) over the floor surface for radiation protection.

## A.1 FAILURE PROBABILITY OF THE WOOD FLOOR SYSTEM

This section presents calculations leading to the determination of the probability of failure of the expediently upgraded floor system. This floor system consists of joists, girder, columns, and stud walls.

## A.1.1 Material Properties

The entire floor system, Figures A-1 and A-2, consists of Jack Pine whose properties, for several loading conditions, are given in Table A-1. Specific properties used in this analysis are for 1 sec load duration. The coefficient of variation associated with each of these values is taken as 0.20.

# A.1.2 Applied Load

Two load cases are considered in the analysis, i.e.,

- (1) A uniformly distributed mean pressure,  $\overline{p}$  (psi), with a coefficient of variation,  $\Omega p = 0.20$ .
- (2) A uniformly distributed mean pressure,  $\bar{p}$ , plus 1 ft of soil load.





Figure A-1. Basement plan. (Dunes house)



.

Į.,

1

€.

C

Ţ.

€

Figure A-2. Joist, girder, and upper story partition layout. (Dunes house)

TABLE A-1. MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF JOISTS\*

Property <sup>A#</sup>	Mean Clear Wood Strength Strength	Strength	. A o	Size	Combined	Normal Duration Mean Strength	1.25 day Duration Mean Strength	l hr Duration Mean Strength	l sec Duration Mean Strength
	value, psi	FECTOL	*	ractor	ractor	vatue, par	value, par	rad 'anya	varue, par
<b>,</b> o	9,900	0.63	1/1.6	0.89	0.35	3,450	4,600	5,150	7,100
<b>M</b> .U	2,660	0.78	2/3		0.52	2,950	3,900	4,350	6,050
<b>PL,</b> >	1,170	0.5	1/1.6		0.31	365	480	715	750
Ma M	6,900	0.37	1/1.6		0.23	2,300	3,000	4,450	4,700
נָ	280	1.00	1/1.1	<b>f</b>	0.91	525	525	525	525
<b>K/1</b> 000	1,350	1.00	<b>1</b>		1.00	1,350	1,350	1,350	1,350

Jack Pine

F. - Apture Strength

- Compression Parallel to Grain

- Shear Parallel to Grain

- Tension Parallel to Grain

r P = Compression Perpendicular to Grain

E - Modulus of Elasticity

Structural Light Framing, Select Structural (Table 8, Ref 21)

The dead load of the floor system is neglected. The uniformly distributed pressure,  $\bar{p}$ , is assumed to be applied for 1 sec.

# A.1.3 <u>Member Sizes</u>

Joists: 1.625 in. by 5.625 in. with an average spacing

of 24.12 in.

**Girder:** 5.5 in. by 6.75 in.

Columns: 4.0 in. by 8.0 in.

Studwalls: Columns 2 in. by 4 in. with bracing at mid-

height (Figure A-3).

# A.1.4 Assumptions

(1) Joists 1 through 17 (Figure A-2) are identical and continuous over the girder and the stud walls.

(2) The connections between the flooring and the joists are not sufficiently strong to develop composite action. Therefore, the joists act independent of the flooring.

(3) The flexibility of the girder in calculating joist stresses is neglected. The girder is assumed to provide a rigid support for the joists.

(4) Resistance along a member is perfectly correlated, i.e., failure of the member occurs at the point of maximum load effect.

# A.1.5 Failure Probability of a Joist

The joist loading, shear and bending moment diagrams are shown in Figure A-4.

 $M_{\text{max}} = M = 9759 \,\overline{p} \, \text{lb/in.} (\overline{p} \, \text{is in lb/in.}^2)$ 

 $V_{\text{max}} = V = 891 \overline{p} \text{ lb } (\overline{p} \text{ is in lb/in.}^2)$ 

 $\Omega_{\rm M} = \Omega_{\rm V} = 0.20$ .

# A.1.5.1 Modes of Failure - Bending

$$\theta_b = N_{g1} \frac{F_b}{f_b} = N_{g1} F_b S/M$$
 (A-1)




Figure A-3. Expedient upgrading.




Figure A-4. Joist loading, shear and bending moment diagrams.

where  $\theta_b$  = safety factor in bending

 $N_{gl}$  = correction factor on the flexural formula

 $\vec{F}_b$  = rupture strength (see Table A-1)

 $f_b = applied bending stress$ 

S = section modulus.

$$\overline{\theta}_b = \overline{N}_{al} \overline{F}_b \overline{S/M}$$
 (A-2)

 $\overline{\theta}_{b}$  = mean safety factor and the remaining parameters are mean values of those identified in equation (A-1).

$$\Omega_{\theta_b} = \sqrt{\Omega_{g1}^2 + \Omega_b^2 + \Omega_S^2 + \Omega_M^2}$$
 (A-3)

where  $\Omega_{\theta_b}$ ,  $\Omega_{gl}$ ,  $\Omega_b$ ,  $\Omega_S$ , and  $\Omega_M$  are coefficients of variation of  $\overline{\theta}_b$ ,  $\overline{N}_{gl}$ ,  $\overline{F}_b$ ,  $\overline{S}$ , and  $\overline{M}$ , respectively.

# a. Uncertainty in the Flexure Formula

Due to the difference between the idealized linear elastic formula and the real case, assume  $\overline{N}_{gl}$  = 0.95 with a uniform distribution between 0.90 and 1.0, as shown in Figure A-5 below.




Figure A-5. Uniform distribution.

For a uniform distribution, see Figure A-5.

$$\Omega = \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}} \frac{B - A}{B + A} \quad (Ref 22)$$

thus,  $\Omega_{g1} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}} \frac{0.10}{1.90} = 0.03$ .

## b. Uncertainty in the Section Modulus, S

$$S = \frac{\bar{b}\bar{h}^2}{b} \tag{A-5}$$

where  $\vec{b}$  = width of the joist  $\vec{h}$  = depth of the joist.

If b and h are perfectly correlated, then the coefficient variation of S is

$$\Omega_{S} = \sqrt{\Omega_{b}^{2} + 4\Omega_{h}^{2} + 4\Omega_{b}\Omega_{h}}$$
 (A-6)

Assume that  $\delta_b$  =  $\delta_h$  = 0.05. Also, due to humidity effects, let  $\Delta_b$  =  $\Delta_h$  = 0.05. Thus

$$\Omega_{h} = \Omega_{b} = \sqrt{a_{b}^{2} + \Delta_{b}^{2}} = 0.07$$

$$\Omega_{S} = \sqrt{(0.07)^{2} + 4(0.07)^{2} + 4(0.07)(0.07)} = 0.21$$

Due to possible existence of notches, the mean height of the joists is taken as 0.8h. The section modulus,  $\overline{5}$ , becomes

$$\overline{S} = \frac{1.625(0.8 \times 5.625)^2}{b} = 5.484 \text{ (in.)}^3$$

# c. Determination of $\overline{\theta}_b$ and $\Omega_{\theta_b}$

From equations (A-1) and (A-3),

$$\overline{\theta}_h = 0.95(7100)(5.484)/9759 \,\overline{p} = 3.790/\overline{p}$$

$$\Omega_{\theta_b} = [(0.03)^2 + (0.20)^2 + (0.21)^2 + (0.20)^2]^{\frac{1}{2}} = 0.354$$

## d. Probability of Failure Due to Bending

$$P(F_b) = 1 - \Phi \left[ \frac{\ln (3.79/\overline{p})}{0.354} \right] = 1 - \Phi \left[ \frac{1.332 - \ln \overline{p}}{0.354} \right]$$
 (A-7)

#### A.1.5.2 Modes of Failure - Shear

$$\theta_{V} = N_{g2} \frac{F_{V}}{f_{V}} = 2N_{g2} F_{V} A/3V$$
 (A-8)

where  $\theta_v = safety$  factor in shear

 $N_{g2}$  = correction factor on the shear formula

 $F_v =$  shear strength (see Table A-1)

 $f_v$  = shear stress due to applied load

A = cross-sectional area of joist

$$\Omega_{\theta_{V}} = (\Omega_{g2}^{2} + \Omega_{F_{V}}^{2} + \Omega_{A}^{2} + \Omega_{V}^{2})^{\frac{1}{2}}$$
(A-9)

# a. Uncertainties in the Shear Formula

Assume that  $\Omega_{\rm g2}$  =  $\Omega_{\rm g1}$ . Thus,  $\Omega_{\rm g2}$  = 0.03

$$\Omega_{F_{\nu}} = 0.20$$
 (estimated)

$$\Omega_{A} = (\Omega_{b}^{2} + \Omega_{b}^{2} + 2\Omega_{b}\Omega_{b})^{\frac{1}{2}}$$

$$\Omega_{A} = [(0.07)^{2} + (0.07)^{2} + 2(0.07)(0.07)]^{\frac{1}{2}} = 0.14$$

$$\Omega_{V} = 0.20 \text{ (estimated)}$$

b. Determination of  $\overline{\theta}_{v}$  and  $\Omega_{\theta_{v}}$ 

$$\overline{\theta}_{V} = 2\overline{N}_{g2} \overline{F}_{V} \overline{A}/3\overline{V} = 2(0.95)(750)(1.625)(0.8)(5.625)/(3)(891)\overline{p}$$

$$\overline{\theta}_{V} = 3.898/\overline{p}$$

$$\Omega_{\theta_{V}} = [(0.03)^{2} + (0.20)^{2} + (0.14)^{2} + (0.20)^{2}]^{\frac{1}{2}} = 0.317$$

c. Probability of Failure Due to Shear

$$P(F_V) = 1 - \phi \left[ \frac{\ln (3.898/\bar{p})}{0.317} \right] = 1 - \phi \left[ \frac{1.361 - \ln \bar{p}}{0.317} \right]$$
 (A-10)

## A.1.5.3 Joist Failure Probability

The joist can fail in flexure or in shear. As discussed in Section 3.3, if the two failure modes are independent of each other than the failure probability of the joist,  $P(F_{\rm j})$  is

$$P(F_j) = 1 - [1 - P(F_b)][1 - P(F_v)]$$
 (A-11)

If the failure modes are highly correlated, then

$$P(F_i) = max[P(F_h), P(F_v)]$$
 (A-12)

The actual failure probability for the joist is between these two probabilities, thus

$$\max[P(F_b), P(F_v)] \le P(F_1) \ge 1 - [1 - P(F_b)][1 - P(F_v)]$$
 (A-13)

Failure probabilities of the joist were computed and are shown in Figure A-6. Failure probabilities  $P(F_b)$  and  $P(F_v)$  were computed using equations (A-7) and A-10), respectively. The upper bound failure probability was computed using equation (A-11).

It is noted (see Figure A-6) that the two bounds, i.e.,  $P(F_j)$  and  $P(F_v)$  are fairly close. In this analysis,  $P(F_j)$  is taken as the failure probability for the joist.

#### A.1.5.4 Failure Probability of the Joist System

When all joists are identical and subject to the same load distribution and intensity, then conditions between the joists are perfectly correlated. On this basis the failure probability of the joist system is represented with the failure probability of one joist. Therefore, the upper bound values given in Figure A-6 are conservatively considered as the failure probability of the entire joist system.

#### A.1.6 Failure Probability of the Girder

As shown in Figure A-2, the girder consists of two parts, i.e., the part between columns 1 and 3 (part 1) and the part between columns 3 and the south wall (part 2). The two parts are analyzed separately.

# A.1.6.1 Analysis of Girder, Part 1

The configuration of this portion of the girder is shown in Figure A-7. The loading, P, is due to joists.




Figure A-6. Probability of joist failure.




Figure A-7. Girder loading, Part 1.

 $\overline{P} = 1278\overline{p}$  (see Figure A-4)

where  $\overline{P}$  = mean value of the joist load, lb

p = mean value of the uniform pressure, psi.

$$\overline{M} = 41.323\overline{P} = 41.323(1278)\overline{P} = 52810.8\overline{P}$$

where  $\overline{M}$  = mean value of the maximum bending moment on the girder (at the center support).

$$\overline{V} = 2.502\overline{P} = 2.502(1278)\overline{p} = 3197.6\overline{p}$$

where  $\overline{V}$  = mean value of the maximum shear on the girder (to the left of center support).

$$\Omega_{\rm M} = \Omega_{\rm V} = \Omega_{\rm p} = 0.20$$

#### a. Bending

$$\overline{\theta}_{b} = \overline{N}_{g1} \overline{F}_{b} \overline{S/M}$$

$$\overline{S} = \frac{bh^{2}}{6} = \frac{6.75(5.5)^{2}}{6} = 34.03 \text{ (in.)}^{3}$$

$$\overline{\theta}_{b} = (0.95)(7100)(34.03)/(52810.8\overline{p}) = 4.3463/\overline{p}$$

$$\Omega_{\theta_{b}} = (\Omega_{g1}^{2} + \Omega_{F_{b}}^{2} + \Omega_{S}^{2} + \Omega_{M}^{2})^{\frac{1}{2}} = 0.354$$

$$P(F_{b}) = 1 - \Phi\left(\frac{2n\theta_{b}}{\Omega_{\theta_{b}}}\right) = 1 - \Phi\left(\frac{1.469 - 2n\overline{p}}{0.354}\right)$$
(A-14)

## b. Shear

$$\overline{\theta}_V = 2\overline{N}_{g2} \overline{F}_V \overline{A}/3\overline{V}$$

$$\overline{\theta}_V = 2(0.95)(750)(6.75)(5.5)/3(3197.6\overline{p}) = 5.515/\overline{p}$$

$$\Omega_{\theta_V} = 0.317 \text{ (Determined earlier in connection with joist analysis)}$$

$$P(F_{v}) = 1 - \Phi\left(\frac{2n\overline{\theta}_{v}}{\Omega_{\theta_{v}}}\right) = 1 - \Phi\left(\frac{1.707 - 2n\overline{p}}{0.317}\right) \tag{A-15}$$

### A.1.6.2 Analysis of Girder, Part 2

The configuration of this portion of the girder is shown in Figure A-8.




Figure A-8. Girder loading, Part 2.

$$\overline{P} = 1278\overline{p}$$
 (see Figure A-4)

$$\overline{M} = 26.382\overline{P} = 26.382(1278\overline{p}) = 33716.2\overline{p}$$

where  $\overline{\mathbf{M}}$  = mean value of the maximum moment on the girder

$$\overline{V} = 2.289\overline{P} = 2.289(1278\overline{p}) = 2925.3\overline{p}$$

where  $\overline{V}$  = mean value of the maximum shear on the girder

$$\overline{\theta}_{h} = (0.95)(7100)(34.03)/33716.2\overline{p} = 6.808/\overline{p}$$

$$\Omega_{\theta_h} = 0.354$$
 (computed previously)

$$P(F_b) = 1 - \Phi\left(\frac{1.918 - 2n\overline{p}}{0.354}\right)$$
 (A-16)

$$\overline{\theta}_{v} = 2\overline{N}_{g2} F_{v} \overline{A}/3\overline{V}$$

$$\overline{\theta}_{v} = 2(0.95)(750)(6.75)(5.5)/3(2925.3\overline{p}) = 6.028/\overline{p}$$

$$\Omega_{\theta_{v}} = 0.317$$
 (computed previously)

$$P(F_{V}) = 1 - \phi \left( \frac{1.796 - \ln \overline{p}}{0.317} \right)$$
 (A-17)

Failure probabilities for the girder, parts 1 and 2, are shown in Figures A-9 and A-10. As previously, three curves are given, i.e., probability of failure due to bending,  $P(F_b)$ , probability of failure due to shear,  $P(F_v)$ , and the upper bound probabilities,  $P(F_{g1})$  and  $P(F_{g2})$ , computed using equation (A-13). In each case, the actual failure probability is between the bounds of  $P(F_v)$  and  $P(F_{g1})$ , i=1,2.

### A.1.7 Failure Probability of Columns

#### A.1.7.1 Existing Columns

The location and spacing of columns is shown in Figures  $\Lambda$ -1 and  $\Lambda$ -2. For a uniformly distributed pressure load over the floor surface, the axial loads on the five columns have the following values:

 $P_1 = 1.498P$ 

 $P_2 = 4.592P$ 

 $P_3 = 2.544P$ 

 $P_4 = 3.655P$ 

 $P_5 = 3.595P$ 

where P = 1278p, p = the uniformly distributed floor load in psi (lb/in.<sup>2</sup>).

The following formula (Ref 23) was used for evaluating the failure probability of the five timber columns:

$$\frac{P}{A} = F_{c} = \frac{0.30E}{(\ell/d)^{2}}$$
 (A-18)




Figure A-9. Probability of girder failure (Part 1).

70




Figure A-10. Probability of girder failure (Part 2).

where P = column load

A = cross-sectional area of column

E = modulus of elasticity

L = unsupported column length

d = least dimension of the rectangular cross-section of the column.

Columns used in this basement consist of 4-2 in.  $\times$  4 in. boards nailed together. The columns had the following properties:

Cross-section = 3.5 in.  $\times$  6.0 in.

Length = 76.0 in.

 $E = modulus of elasticity = 1.35 (10)^6 psi.$ 

The coefficient of variation of  $\mathbf{F}_{\mathbf{C}}$  is obtained as

$$V(F_c) = \left(\frac{\partial F_c}{\partial E}\right)^2 V(E) + \left(\frac{\partial F_c}{\partial d}\right)^2 V(d)$$
 (A-19)

where V() = variance of the given parameter. In this analysis E and d are considered to be random variables. The length, £, is assumed to be a constant.

$$\Omega_{F_c} = \frac{\sqrt{V(F_c)}}{F_c} = \sqrt{\Omega_E^2 + 4\Omega_d^2}$$
 (A-20)

 $\Omega_{\rm E}$  = 0.20

 $\Omega_{d} = 0.07$  [see  $\Omega_{h}$  in equation (A-6)]

$$\Omega_{F_c} = [(0.20)^2 + 4(0.07)^2]^{\frac{1}{2}} = 0.24$$

$$\theta_{c} = N_{gc} \frac{F_{c}}{f_{c}}$$
 (A-21)

where N = correction factor on the column fomula, estimated at 0.95 (see "Uncertainty in the Flexure Formula" and Figure A-5)

f = column stress due to applied load.

$$\overline{\theta}_{c} = (0.3)\overline{N}_{gc} E \overline{A}/[(2/\overline{d})^{2}\overline{P}_{i}] \qquad (A-22)$$

where 
$$\overline{P}_i$$
 = applied column load, i = 1,5  
 $\ell/d = 76/3.5 = 21.71$   
 $\theta_c = (0.30)(0.95)(1,350,000)(3.5)(6.0)/[21.71)^2 \overline{P}_i] = 17,143/\overline{P}_i$ .

$$\Omega_{\theta_c} = (\Omega_{gc}^2 + \Omega_{F_c}^2 + \Omega_A^2 + \Omega_{P_i}^2)^{\frac{1}{2}}$$
(A-23)
$$\Omega_{gc} = 0.03, \text{ (see A-4)}$$

$$\Omega_{F_c} = 0.24$$

$$\Omega_A = 0.14$$

$$\Omega_{P_i} = 0.20$$

$$\Omega_{\theta_c} = [(0.03)^2 + (0.24)^2 + 0.14)^2 + (0.20)^2]^{\frac{1}{2}} = 0.34$$

Expressions for computing failure probabilities for the five columns are given next.

<u>Column</u>	P <sub>i</sub>	<u>θ</u> c	P(F <sub>c1</sub> )	
1	1914.4p	8.9544/p	$1 - \phi \left( \frac{2.1921 - \ln \overline{p}}{0.34} \right)$	(A-23)
2	5868.6p	2.9211/p	$1 - \Phi\left(\frac{1.0720 - \ell n\overline{p}}{0.34}\right)$	(A-24)
3	3251.2p	5.2727/p	$1 - \phi\left(\frac{1.6625 - \ln \overline{p}}{0.34}\right)$	(A-25)
4	4671.1p	3.6699/ <del>p</del>	$1 - \Phi\left(\frac{1.3002 - \ell np}{0.34}\right)$	(A-26)
5	4594.4p	3.7312/p	$1 - \phi \left( \frac{1.3167 - \ell n \overline{p}}{0.34} \right)$	(A-27)

Corresponding failure probabilities are shown in Figure A-11.  $P(F_C)$  is the column system failure probability assuming that the columns act independent of each other. It was computed using the following expression, see equation (49):

$$P(F_c) = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{s} [1 - P(F_{ci})]$$
 (A-28)

The lower bound is represented by  $P(F_{c1})$ .

#### A.1.7.2 Studwall Columns

The studwall columns used in the expedient upgrading of the basement are shown in Figure A-3. See Figure A-1 for the center to center dimensions.

Studwall column cross-section = 1.5 in.  $\times$  3.5 in.

Height, l = 76 in.

 $\ell/d = 76/(2 \times 1.5) = 25.33$ 

Column load: East side,  $P_e = 1683\overline{p}$  (see Figure A-4) West side,  $P_w = 1490\overline{p}$ 

Studwall columns at each side (east or west) are identical. Failure of the column system at each side, therefore, is represented by the failure of one column.


$$\overline{\theta}_{c} = \overline{N}_{gc} F_{c} A/\overline{P}_{1}$$

where  $\overline{F}_c$  is defined by equation (A-18), thus

$$\overline{\theta}_{c} = 0.3N_{gc} E A/[(\ell/\overline{d})^{2}\overline{P}_{i}], \Omega_{\theta_{c}} = 0.34$$

For the east side:

 $\overline{\theta}_c = 0.3(0.95)(1,350,000)(1.5)(3.5)/[(25.33)^21683\overline{p}] = 1.8706/\overline{p}$ 



$$P(F_{Se}) = 1 - \Phi\left(\frac{0.6263 - \ln \overline{p}}{0.34}\right)$$
 (A-24)

For the west side:

$$\theta_c = 0.3(0.95)(1,350,000)(1.5)(3.5)/[(25.33)^2 1490 \overline{p}] = 2.1129/\overline{p}$$

$$P(F_{SW}) = 1 - \Phi\left(\frac{0.7481 - \ln \overline{p}}{0.34}\right)$$
 (A-25)

Results are shown in Figure A-12. For the column system comprising the two studwalls, the lower bound failure probability is given by  $P(F_{SW})$ . The upper bound is given by  $P(F_{S})$ , which was computed using the expression

$$P(F_s) = 1 - [1 - P(F_{sw})][1 - P(F_{se})]$$
 (A-26)

# A.1.8 Failure Probability of the System

Upper bound values are obtained based on the assumption that the conditions between different components are statistically independent. Lower bound values are based on the perfect correlation assumption between the components.


P(F\*) = upper bound failure probability

$$P(F^*) = 1 - [1 - P(F_j)][1 - P(F_{g1})][1 - P(F_{g2})][1 - P(F_c)][1 - P(F_{sw})][1 - P(F_{se})]$$
 (A-27)

P(F') = lower bound failure probability

$$P(F') = \max[P(F_j), P(F_{q1}), P(F_{q2}), P(F_c), P(F_{sw}), P(F_{se})]$$
 (A-28)

Results are plotted in Figure A-13.






Figure A-13. Probability of floor system failure, upper and lower bound.

#### A.2 PROBABILITY OF PEOPLE SURVIVAL

As shown in Figure A-13, the relevant range of overpressures is between 0 and about 5 psi. In this range, the dominant casualty mechanism for people in basements is debris from the collapse of the overhead floor system and the upper story. The upper story is expected to fail in the range of 1.5 psi to 2.9 psi. The following failure probabilities are extimated (Ref 24).

Probability of Failure (%)	Overpressure (psi)
10	1.5
50	2.2
90	2.9

Probability of people survival against structural collapse is determined using the theorem of total probabilities (Ref 25) as

$$P(S_{SC}) = P(S|\overline{F})P(\overline{F}) + P(S|F)P(F)$$
 (A-29)

where  $P(S_{sc})$  = probability of people survival against structural collapse

 $P(S|\overline{F})$  = probability of people survival given that the structure (floor system) does not fail

P(F) = probability of structure survival

P(S|F) = probability of people survival given that the structure collapses (fails)

P(F) = probability of structural failure = 1 -  $P(\overline{F})$ .

For this structure, P(F) is given by equations (A-27) and (A-28).

No fatality level casualties are expected prior to the collapse of the floor system and, therefore,  $P(S|\overline{F})$  is set equal to 1. Probability of survival given that the structure collapses, P(S|F), is estimated to be 0.5. It is based on the following reasoning.

When the floor system over the basement collapses, the debris is not expted to affect the entire shelter area. Several portions of the basement are expected to be free of debris. People located in these areas will be survivors. At least one half of the total basement area is expected to be

free of debris effects. For people uniformly distributed, the probability of survival is, therefore, estimated as 0.5.

Probability of people survival results are given in Figure A-14. Two cases are considered, i.e., with and without soil cover for radiation protection.

The analysis and results given here represent an update and revision of results given in Reference 20.




Figure A-14. Probability of people survival, upper and lower bound.

#### APPENDIX B

# PROBABILITY OF PEOPLE SURVIVAL IN UPGRADED BASEMENTS OF SINGLE FAMILY RESIDENCES

#### **B.1 INTRODUCTION**

This appendix contains results on the probability of survival of people located in basements of framed, single-family residences when subjected to the blast effects of a single, megaton yield unclear weapon detonated near the ground surface. Four buildings are considered. In each, the basement is expediently upgraded against blast effects by providing additional supports for the joist floor system. Additional supports are either studwalls or post and beam (girder and column) systems. Six cases are considered:

<b>Building Name</b>	Type of Upgrading
1. Dunes House	Studwall (see Figure A-3) Girder and Column (see Figure B-1)
2. West House	Studwall
3. Park House	Studwall
4. Tea Pot House	Studwall Girder and Column

The analysis considering the Dunes House with the studwall upgrading is described in Appendix A, which also contains the probability of structural filure and people survival results. The remaining cases outlined above are summarized in the following sections.

#### **B.2 GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS**

- (1) The basement framing system (joists, girders, columns) for each building is assumed to consist of "Jack Pine" whose properties are given in Table A-1.
- (2) The expedient upgrading system (studwall, girder and column) is also assumed to consist of Jack Pine.
- (3) The upper story in each case is assumed to fail and be removed by the blast in the overpressure range of 1.5 to 2.9 psi (Ref 24).
- (4) There is no interaction between the upper story and the basement framing systems, i.e., the upper story is assumed to cause no damage to the basement while being broken and removed by the blast loading.





Figure B-1. Post and beam expedient upgrading concept.

- (5) Dead load of the floor system over the basement is neglected. This amounts to approximately 15 psf.
- (6) People are assumed to be uniformly distributed in all basement areas.
- (7) The only casualty mechanism considered in the analysis is debris from the breakup and collapse of the floor system into the basement area.
- (8) Basement walls are assumed to be stronger then all other structural components and are, therefore, assumed not to fail. Analyses to determine failure overpressures for the peripheral basement walls were not performed. However, based on the results of full-scale field tests (Ref 26) this is a reasonable assumption in this case.



#### **B.3 DUNES HOUSE**

1

t.

0

The basement of this house is described in Appendix A where it was analyzed with an expedient blast upgrading consisting of a studwall in each of the two joist spans (see Figure A-2). In this section the expedient upgrading consists of the "girder and column" concept (see Figure B-1) with and without soil cover for nuclear radiation protection. The size (cross-section and length) of girders used is assumed to be the same as that of the existing girder. Columns are also assumed to be of the same size and number as the existing columns and are assumed to be identically spaced and supported. The analysis was performed along the lines described in Appendix A. Results are summarized.

#### B.3.1 Failure Probabilities


Failure probabilities for all structural components making up the floor system and its supporting elements, except the basement walls, are given in Figures B-2 through B-4. Figure B-2 illustrates failure probabilities for the joists and the existing girder. Failure probabilities for existing columns and columns used with the expedient upgrading are given in Figure B-3. Failure probabilities for the two sets of girders used in the expedient upgrading are given in Figure B-4. Each of the curves is an upper bound on the particular failure probability and was determined using equation (49). The bounds on the probability of failure of this expediently upgraded floor system are given in Figure B-5 for the case without soil cover. In this figure, P(F\*), the upper bound, is based on equation (49) and P(F¹), the lower bound, represents the failure probability of upgrading column 2 located in the east joist span (see Figure A-2).

# B.3.2 People Survival Probabilities

Probabilities of people survival are given in Figure B-6, which includes two cases, i.e., with and without soid cover. Probability of survival is against the effects of debris produced by the breakup of the floor system.

#### **B.4 WEST HOUSE**

This an existing single-family dwelling whose basement floor plan is shown in Figure B-7. The floor system over the basement consists of a subfloor



Joists and existing girder failure Probabilities, Dunes House. Figure 8-2.

0

0




Figure B-3. Column failure probabilities, Dunes House.

and the second section of the second section is




Figure B-4. Upgrading girders failure probabilities, Dunes House.

O

0

0




Figure B-5. Probability of floor system failure, upper and lower bound, Dunes House.





Figure B-6. Probability of people survival, upper and lower bound, Dunes House.

O



8

C

C

C

C 0 0

Figure B-7. West House, plan.

and a finish floor supported by 2 in. x 10 in. joists spaced at 16 in. The two joist spans are simply supported. The existing girder is 6 in. x 10 in. and consists of two parts. Part 1 extends from the front wall of the house to column 2. Part 2 extends from column 2 to the rear wall of the house. The three columns have a cross-section of 6 in. by 6 in. Their unsupported length is 77 in.

The floor system is assumed to be upgraded using studwalls in each of the two joist spans. The studs are 2 in. x 4 in. and are spaced at 16 in. as are the joists. Their total height is 70 in. They are braced at half-height as shown in Figure A-3. The analysis was performed along the lines described in Appendix A. Results are summarized.

#### B.4.1 Failure Probabilities

Failure probabilities for the joists and the two girders are given in Figure B-8. Failure probabilities for the columns and studwalls are given in Figure B-9. Each of these curves is an upper bound on the particular probability and was determined using equation (49).

The bounds on the probability of failure of the whole floor system, including columns and studwalls, are given in Figure B-10. P(F)\*, the upper bound probability of failure of the system, was obtained using equation (49) and P(F)\*, the lower bound, represents the failure probability of the studwalls.


#### B.4.2 People Survival Probabilities

Probabilities of people survival against the effects of debris from the collapse of the floor system into the basement are given in Figure B-11. Two cases are considered, i.e., with and without soil cover for radiation protection. Probability of survival is against the effects of debris produced by the collapse of the floor system into the basement.

#### **B.5 PARK HOUSE**

This is an existing residence whose basement floor plan is shown in Figure B-12. The floor system over the basement consists of a subfloor and a finish floor supported by 2 in. x 8 in. joists spaced at 12 in. on center.

 $\langle \cdot \rangle$ 



Ç,

C

C

Figure B-8. Failure probabilities for the joists, Girder 1 and Girder 2, Mest House.




Figure B-9. Failure probabilities for columns and studwalls, West House.

Ō





Figure B-10. Probability of floor system failure, upper and lower bound, West House.






Figure 8-12. Park House, plan.

The joists are continuous over the centrally located girder and columns. The girder is 8 in.  $\times$  9 in. and consists of three separate parts. The first part spans from the east wall to column 2 (see Fig\_(2 B-12), the second part spans from column 2 to column 4, and the third part spans from column 4 to the west wall. The five wood columns have an cross-section of 6 in.  $\times$  6 in. Their unsupported length is approximately 7 ft  $8\frac{1}{2}$  in.

The floor system is assumed to be expediently upgraded using studwalls in each of the two joist spans. This expedient upgrading is illustrated in Figures B-13 and B-14. The studs are 2 in. x 4 in. and are spaced at 12 in., i.e., one under each joist. Their total height is shown in Figure B-14 and they are braced at half-height. In addition to structurally upgrading the floor, the basement shelter is also assumed to be mounded with soil up to the top of the floor as shown in Figure B-13.

The analysis was performed along the lines described in Appendix A. Results are summarized.

## B.5.1 Failure Probabilities

Failure probabilities for the joists and the three timber girders supporting them are shown in Figure B-15. The combined failure probabilities for the columns are given in Figure B-16 together with the failure probability of the studwalls. Each of these curves represents an upper bound and was determined using equation (49).

The bounds on the probability of failure of the whole floor system, including columns and studwalls, are given in Figure B-17.  $P(F)^*$ , the upper bound probability of failure of the system, was obtained using equation (49).  $P(F)^*$ , the lower bound for the system, is the failure probability of the studwalls.

# B.5.2 People Survival Probabilities

Probabilities of people survival against the effects of debris from the collapse of the floor system into the basement are given in Figure B-18. Two cases are considered, i.e., with and without soil cover for radiation protection.

 $\odot$ 




Figure B-13. Elevation (Section A-A).




Figure B-14. Studwall expedient upgrading.





Figure B-15. Failure probabilities of joists and existing girders, Park House.

Ç




C

0


G

Figure B-16. Failure probabilities of columns and studwalls, Park House.



Probability of floor system failure, upper and lower bound, Park House. Figure B-17.

Ō



**Ç**,

C,

C

C

C

9 9 9

#### **B.6** TEA POT HOUSE

This is a two-story, single-family residence originally constructed and tested in Nevada (Ref 26). This building has a full basement with a back entrance, an entrance from the house, and six window wells. The basement plan is shown in Figure B-19.

The floor over the basement consists of a subfloor and a finish floor supported by 2 in. x 8 in. joists spaced at 16 in. centers. The joists (assumed to be continuous over the 33 ft 4 in. length of the house) are supported by two 6 in. x 8 in. girders and the basement walls. The two girders are supported by four steel pipe columns and the basement walls. The peripheral basement walls are made of concrete block. Two expedient upgrading schemes were considered and are described as follows:

## a. Scheme 1


The two long (13 ft 4 in.) joist spans were each assumed to be supported by a studwall located halfway between the columns and the walls. This concept calls for a 2 in. x 4 in. stud under each joist.

Entranceways into the basement are assumed to be closed (blocked) by means of expedient blast closures. Window glass is assumed to be removed and the openings are also assumed to be blocked by means of expedient blast closures.

The basement is mounded with soil on the outside up to the first floor level, about 2 ft. One foot of soil is assumed to be placed on the first floor for fallout radiation protection.

# b. Scheme 2

This expedient upgrading scheme is the same as the first scheme except that instead of a studwall, the two joist spans are assumed to be upgraded by girders and columns located halfway between the existing columns and the walls. The girder is assumed to be of the same size and the same material as the existing girder. The columns consist of "Southern Pine," have a 6 in. x 4 in. cross-section, are 8 ft long, and have the following properties with respect to an axial load:



C

C

C

C

0

Figure B-19. Tea Pot House basement plan.

 $F_c$  (compression parallel to the grain) = 1350 psi

E (modulus of elasticity) = 1,700,000 psi.

Upgrading columns are assumed to have the same spacing as the existing columns. This concept is illustrated in general in Figure B-l.

## B.6.1 Failure Probabilities, Scheme 1, Studwall Upgrading

Failure probabilities for the joists and existing girders are shown in Figure B-20. Failure probabilities for existing columns and the studwalls used for upgrading are shown in Figure B-21. Upper and lower bounds on the failure probability of the system as a whole is shown in Figure B-22. In this case the lower bound is the failure probability of the studwalls also shown in Figure B-21. The upper bound was computed using equation (49).

## B.6.2 People Survival Probabilities, Scheme 1, Studwall Upgrading


People survival probabilities are presented in Figure B-23 and include two cases, i.e., with and without soil cover for fallout radiation protection. Probability of survival is against the effects of debris produced by the breakup of the floor system over the basement.

# B.6.3 Failure Probabilities, Scheme 2, Girder and Column Upgrading

Failure probabilities for the joists, the existing girders, and the girders used in the expedient upgrading are given in Figure B-24. Failure probabilities for existing columns and the columns used in the expedient upgrading are shown in Figure B-25. Upper and lower bounds on the failure probability of the system as a whole are shown in Figure B-26. In this case the lower bound is the failure probability of the columns used in the expedient upgrading. This is also shown in Figure B-25. The upper bound was computed using equation (49).

# B.6.4 People Survival Probabilities, Scheme 2, Girder and Column Upgrading

People survival probabilities for this concept are given in Figure B-27. Two cases are considered, i.e., with and without soil cover for fallout radiation protection. Probability of survival is against the effects of debris produced by the breakup of the floor system over the basement. It is evident that the difference between the upper and the lower bounds on the probability of survival is negligible in this case.



C

Figure B-20. Joists and existing girders failure probabilities, Scheme 1, Ta Pot House.





Figure B-21. Studwalls and existing columns failure probabilities, Scheme 1 Tea Pot House.

Ō



r,

ſ,

C

Figure B-22. Probability of floor system failure, upper and lower bound, Scheme 1, Tea Pot House.




Figure B-23. Probability of people survival, upper and lower bound, Scheme 1, Tea Pot House.




Figure B-24. Joist and girder failure probabilities, Scheme 2, Tea Pot House.

O




Figure B-25. Failure probabilities of columns, Scheme 2, Tea Pot House.




Figure B-26. Probability of floor system failure, upper and lower bound, Scheme 2, Tea Pot House.




Figure B-27. Probability of people survival, upper and lower bound, Scheme 2, Tea Pot House.

#### APPENDIX C

### STRUCTURAL FAILURE AND PEOPLE SURVIVAL PROBABILITY DATA

This appendix contains detailed results on the probability of structural failure and the probability of people survival for the reinforced concrete shelters described in Chapter 4. The general concept of the basic basement shelters is illustrated in Figure 1. These basements were designed for live loads in the range from 50 psi to 250 psi and span lengths from 12 ft to 20 ft. The basic design data are given in Table 2. Each of the 12 slabs was analyzed as upgraded using four expedient upgrading schemes illustrated in Figure 9. This resulted in 60 sets of shelters whose analysis data are included in Table 3. Results included here are upper and lower bounds on the probability of slab failure and upper and lower bounds on the probability of people survival.





Figure C-1. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 1A.



Control of the Contro

 $\mathcal{O}$ 

Figure C-2. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 1A.





Figure C-3. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 1B.

ີ)

Control of the second of the s






Figure C-5. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 1C.

)

C

C

(..

Ċ

C




Figure C-6. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 1C.



Figure C-7. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 1D.

C




Figure C-8. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 1D.




Figure C-9. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 1E.



Č




Figure C-10. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 1E.




Figure C-11. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 2A.




Figure C-12. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 2A.




Figure C-13. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 2B.

O




Figure C-14, Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 28.




Figure C-15. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 2C.

O

0




Figure C-16. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 2C.




Figure C-17. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 2D.

:)




Figure C-18. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 2D.




Figure C-19. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 2E.

.)




Figure C-20. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 2E.




Figure C-21. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 3A.




Figure C-22. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 3A.




Figure C-23. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 3B.

C




Figure C-24. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 3B.




Figure C-25. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 3C.

Ō

 $\odot$ 


(,

C

Œ.

C.

C






Figure C-27. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 3D.

Э

Э





Figure C-28. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 3D.



**£**;

Э

ζ.




Figure C-30. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 3E.




Figure C-31. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 4A.

)

()

ì

Э

Э

Э

¢.

C




Figure C-32. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 4A.




Figure C-33. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 4B.

€,

C,

Ĉ

O




Figure C-34. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 4B.




Figure C-35. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 4C.

Ċ.

٤..

**L**...

C




Figure C-36. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 4C.




Figure C-37. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 4D.




Figure C-38. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 4D.




Figure C-39. Probability of stab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 4E.

C




Figure C-40. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 4E.




Figure C-41. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 5A.





Figure C-42. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 5A.



C-43. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 5B.

O




Figure C-44. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 5B.




Figure C-45. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 5C.



وخاعم وأوالامروار والمخالفة فالمتأوجة فالمدواء

ζ\_-




Figure C-46. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 5C.





Figure C-47. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 5D.




Figure C-48. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 5D.




Figure C-49. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 5E.




Figure C-50. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 5E.





Figure C-51. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 6A.

C

ι

C






Figure C-53. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 6B.

Figure C-54. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 6B.





Figure C-55. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 6C.

ŧ,

Ũ,

€.



Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 6C. Figure C-56.

170

1

Figure C-57. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 6D.

O




Figure C-58. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 6D.

C

0




Figure C-59. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 6E.



O

O




Figure C-60. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 6E.




Figure C-61. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 7A.




Figure C-62. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 7A.




Figure C-63. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 7B.

C




Figure C-64. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 7B.





Figure C-65. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 7C.

J






Figure C-66. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 7C.





Figure C-67. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 7D.



r,

**3**°.

€.

ſ.

ť.

ſ.




Figure C-68. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 7D.




Figure C-69. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 7E.




Figure C-70. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 7E.




Figure C-72. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 8A.




Figure C-73. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 8B.

(




Figure C-74. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 88.




Figure C-75. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 8C.




Figure C-76. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 8C.




Figure C-77. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 8D.




Figure C-78. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 8D.





Figure C-79. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 8E.



₹,

ď,

4.

ŧ.

8E3

CASE

Figure C-80. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 8E.




Figure C-81. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 9A.




Figure C-82. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 9A.

Figure C-83. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 98.




Figure C-84. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 98.




Figure C-85. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 9C.




Figure C-86. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 9C.




Figure C-87. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 9D.




Figure C-88. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 9D.




Figure C-89. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 9E.






Figure C-90. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 9E.




Figure C-91. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 10A.




Figure C-92. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 10A.





Figure C-93. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 108.



8

7

ŧ




Figure C-94. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 10B.





Figure C-95. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 10C.

-






Figure C-97. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 10D.

٢.

Ü




Figure C-98. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 10D.





Figure C-99. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 10E.






Figure C-100. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 10E.




Figure C-101. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 11A.

Ü

۲,

ſ,

٢,

r.

ſ.





Figure C-102. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 11A.



Ü

 $\mathbb{C}$ 

C

O

O




Figure C-154. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 11B.




Figure C-105. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower hounds) case 11C.

į

(

€.

ű




Figure C-106. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 11C.





Figure C-107. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 11D.



...





Figure C-108. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 11D.






Figure C-110. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 11E.







Figure C-111. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 12A.







227

Figure C-114. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 12B.







Figure C-115. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 12C.



Ø









Figure C-119. Probability of slab failure (upper and lower bounds) case 12E.



€.

CASE 12E3

Figure C-120. Probability of people survival (upper and lower bounds) case 12E.

## REFERENCES

- 1. Murphy, H. L., "Upgrading Basements for Combined Nuclear Weapons Effects: Predesigned Options," Contract DCPA01-76-C-0135, for Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California, October 1977.
- 2. McVay, M., "Response of Expediently Upgraded Reinforced Concrete Slabs to Blast Loading," U.S. Army Engineer waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Miss., 1981.
- 3. Longinow, A., et al, "Debris Motion and Injury Relationships in all Hazard Environments," for Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Contract DCPA01-74-C-0251, Work Unit 1614E, IIT Research Institute, Chicago, IL, July 1976.
- 4. Feinstein, D. I., et al., "Personnel Casualty Study," for Office of Civil Defense, Contract OCD-PS-64-201, IIT Research Institute, Chicago, IL., July 1968.
- 5. Longinow, A., "Probability of People Survival in a Nuclear Weapon Blast Environment," Contract DCPA01-79-C-0240, Work Unit 1621H, for Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C., IIT Research Institute, Chicago, IL., May 1980.
- 6. Biggs, J. M., <u>Introduction to Structural Dynamics</u>, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964.
- 7. Glasstone, S., Ed., Effects of Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1964.
- 8. Private communication from James Beck, James Beck & Associates, Palo Alto, CA., January 1981.
- 9. Crawford, R. E., et al., "The Air Force Manual for Design and Analysis of Hardened Structures," Air Force Weapons Laboratory, Albuquerque, NM., October 1974.
- "Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete," (ACI318-77),
   American Concrete Institute Standard, 1977.
- 11. Ang, A.H.-S. and Tang, W. H., <u>Probability Concepts in Engineering Planning</u> and Design, Volume I, Basic Principles, John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1975.
- 12. Ang. A.H.-S., "Structural Risk Analysis and Reliability-Based Design," ASCE Journal of the Structural Division 99(ST9), September 1973.

- 13. Longinow, A. and Thomopoulus, N., "Probability of Survival," IIT Research Institute In-House Project J1195, January 14, 1981.
- 14. Thomopoulos, N. T., "An Analytical Diagnosis of Uncertainty in Mathematical Models," Industrail Engineering Department, Illinois Institute of Technology (unpublished paper).
- 15. Ang, A.H.-S., et al., "Uncertainty and Survivability Evaluations of Design to Airblast and Ground Shock," for U.S. Army Construction Engineering Research Laboratory, Contract DACA-88-73-C-0040, A.H.-S. Ang Associates, Urbana, IL., June 1974.
- 16. Ang, A.H.-S. and Ma, H-F., "On the Reliability Analysis of Framed Structures," paper presented at the ASCE Specialty Conference on Structural Reliability, Tucson, Arizona, January 1979.
- 17. Beck, C., "Nuclear Weapons Effects Tests of Blast Type Shelters, A Documentary Compendium of Test Reports," Civil Effects Branch, Division Biology and Medicine, U.S.A.E.C., Washington, D.C., June 1969.
- 18. Denton, D. R., "A Dynamic Ultimate Strength Study of Simple-Supported Two-Way Reinforced Concrete Slabs," TR 1-789, U.S. Army Engineer Water-ways Experiment Station, Corp of Engineers, Vicksburg, Miss., July 1967.
- 19. Rowan, William H., et al., "Failure Analysis by Statistical Techniques (FAST)," Volume 1, User's Manual, TRW Systems, for Defense Nuclear Agency, October 31, 1974.
- 20. Longinow, A. and Joyce, R. P., "Load Tests of a Wood Floor Over a Basement," Contract DCPA01-78-C-0223, for Federal Emergency Management Agency, IIT Research Institute, Chicago, IL., June 1980.
- 21. Hoyle, Robert, J., Jr., <u>Wood Technology in the Design of Structures</u>, <u>Mountain Press Publishing Company</u>, <u>Missoula</u>, <u>Montana</u>, <u>4th Edition</u>.
- 22. Ang. A.H.-S., "Approximate Probabilistic Methods for Survivability/ Vulnerability Analysis of Strategic Structures," Contract DNA001-77-C-0177, for Defense Nuclear Agency, N. M. Newmark Consulting Engineering Services, Urbana, IL., July 15, 1978.
- 23. Parker, H., <u>Simplified Design of Structural Wood</u>, John Wiley & Sons, 3rd Edition, 1979 (p. 151).
- 24. Pickering, E. E., Bockholt, J. L., "Probabilistic Air Blast Failure Criteria for Urban Structures," Contract DAHC20-67-C-0136, for Office of Civil Defense, Stanford Research Institute, November 1971.
- 25. Benjamin, J. R. and Cornell, A.C., <u>Probability</u>, <u>Statistics</u>, <u>and Decisions</u> for <u>Civil Engineers</u>, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1970.
- 26. Randall, P.A., "Damage to Conventional and Special Types of Residences Exposed to Nuclear Effects," WT-1194, Operation Teapot, February-May 1955.

ANNEL PRINCESSIES POR UPGINGED SVELTERS

Contract Dis-C-6374

IIT Research Institute (the lassified) August 1962 MESTRECT: The probability of survival is prodicted of people located in conventional, expediently upgraded beamsmasts when subjected to the bleat offects produced by the detenation of a L-HT mappen may the ground surface. The categories of petential shelters are considered here, i.e., engineered beliefings and single-family residences.

The first category included 12 becomments designed for live leads in the range from 50 psf to 250 psf and slide spens from 12 ft to 20 ft. Each of these was analyzed as capedinally upgraded weing four different appraising schema: An expedient upgrading schema involves strongthaming the slide over the base unt by providing informations appears and blocking of all openings into the basement. This resulted in 30 shellers of different strongths which include the conventional, unupgraded slides as base cases.

The second category included four conventional single-family deallings with full becoments. Each was reminated unknown than uppered using a "studen]" uppered content. Two of the becomments were resculated using the "past and bear uppered on content. Then uppered to content and their way and the products of the second to th

A probability of survival function was developed for each shelter and each apprehing scheme. The procedure mead to accomplish this committee of the procedure state for the second that is a probabilistic papel survival advancables the probabilistic papels shelter to the shelter develope. The second is a probabilistic papel survival applies subject considers the compility producing mechanisms, i.e., debris offects from the collapse of the overhead slab and private black. The probability of structural failure is made use of in computing the probability of survival spains debris offerts.

The report includes a description of the shelters amalyzed, a description of the method used in per-tending the analysis, detailed results, conclusions, and recommendations.

DANNEE FUNCTIONS FOR UPGRADED SHELTERS Final Report

Contract DM-C-0374

117 Research Institute (Unclassified) August 1962 AMSTRMCT: The probability of survival is pradicted of paople located in conventional, expediently upgrade becomes when subjected to the blast effects produced by the detonation of a 1-HT wegam mear the ground surface. Two categories of potential shelters are considered here, 1.e., engineered buildings and single-family residences.

The first category included 12 basements designed for live loads in the runge from 50 pet to 250 pet and side spens from 12 ft to 20 ft. Each of these was analyzed as expediently upgraded using four different upgrading scheme involves strengthening the slab over the basemant by previding intermediate supports and blocking of [all openings into the basemant. This resulted in 60 shellows of different strengths which include the conventional, unsupgraded slabs as base cases.

The second catagory included four conventional single-family deplitings with full becaments. Each was evaluated when uppredict telephane statements were revealeabed esting the "post and beam uppreding concept. The of the becaments were revealeabed esting the "post and beam" uppreding concept. These uppreding concepts are essentially similar and were used as intarmadiate supports for strengthening the joist floor systems.

A probability of survival function was developed for each shelter and each upgrading scheme. The procedure used to accomplish this consists of the parts. The first is a probabilistic structural analysis which etermines the probability of failure to the shelter envelope. The second is a probabilistic gauge survival each static considers too casualty producting mechanisms, i.e., debris effects from the colleges of the overhead side and primary blast. The probability of structural failure is made use of in campating the probability of survival applies debris effects.

Ĺ \$ mether med The report includes a description of the shelters analyzed, a description of the iforming the analysis, detailed results, conclusions, and recommendations.

> NUMBER PRECISES FOR WERNERS SPELTERS Tari Pari

Contract Dis-C-6574

III Mesearch institute (Unclassified) August 1962

IIT Research Institute (Unc less filed) August 1962

MESTRICT: The probability of survival is prodicted of people located in conventional, expediently upgraded becames when subjected to the blast effects produced by the decemble of a 1-MT unspen near the ground surface. The categories of potential shelters are considered here, i.e., engineered buildings and single-family residence.

The first category included 12 becomments designed for live leads in the range from 50 psf to 250 psf and slib spens from 12 tt to 20 ft. Each of these was analyzed as empediently upgraded using four different upgrading scheme involves strongthanting the side over the besoment by providing informations experts and blotting of all openings into the besenant. This resulted in 60 shelters of different strongths which include the conventional, unappreded slots as bese cases.

The second cotegory included four conventional single-family deallings with full becoments. Each was enabled which depended using a "statemal" appending encepts. The of the becoments were recollected using the "ipset and beam" uppending concepts are essentially similar and were used as indemnsifiche appends for strengthaning the joist floor systems.

A probability of surrival function was developed for each shelter and each upgrading scheme. The proce-denoming a manual list caselists of the peris. The first is a probabilistic instruction lamples shelted denomings the probability of failure to the shelter cambines. The second is a probabilistic mostly currival denominates the probability of probability probability of structural failure is made use of in computing the probability of survival applies debrie offects.

The report includes a description of the shelters amilyzed, a description of the method used in per-sing the amilysis, detailed results, conclusions, and recommendations

DAMMEE FUNCTIONS FOR UPGRADED SHELTERS Contract EMp-C-0374 Final Report

ARSTRACT: The probability of survival is predicted of people located in conventional, empediently upgraded besometic when subjected to the blast effects produced by the decemation of a LHT ungon more the ground surface. Two categories of potential shelts are considered here, i.e., empleased buildings and single-family residence.

The first category included 12 basements designed for live loads in the runge from 50 paf to 250 paf and silb spens from 12 ft to 20 ft. Each of these was analyzed as espediently upgraded using four different upgrading scheme involves strongthough the side over the basement by previding informatiate supports and blocking off all openings into the basement. This resulted in 60 shallbars of different strengths which include the conventional, unupgraded slabs as base cases.

The second category included four conventional single-family deallings with full becaments. Each was reminated when uppered to a studently uppered in a student when removabled using the "post and beam way appealing a student have uppending concept. Two of the becaments were removabled using the "post and beam uppending to concept. These uppending concepts are essentially similar and were used an intermediate supports for strengthening the joist floor systems.

A probability of survival function was developed for each shelter and each approxing scheme. The procedure said to accomplish full consists of the period. The first is a probabilistic structural analysis which describes the probability of failure to the shelter envelope. The second is a probabilistic neeple survival analysis which considers the casualty producing michanism, i.e., debris offers from the collapse of the overhead side and primary blast. The probability of structural failure is made use of in comparing the probability of survival approach approach and primary continues the collapse of the probability of survival approach and probability of structural failure is made use of in comparing the

ŧ \$ Ì the method The report includes a description of the shelters analyzed, a description of forming the analysis, detailed results, conclusions, and recommendations.

END DATE FILMED